Neurodynamics and the Revival of Associationism in Cognitive Science

  • Pim Haselager


The recent interest in Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) is part of a growing tendency within cognitive science to replace the structure-sensitive processing of representations by associative processes of a neurophysiological kind. More specifically, neurodynamical work on categorization can be located within an associationistic tradition because of its attempt to explain behavior on the basis of correlated processes in the brain. Although associationism is a tradition not favored by traditional cognitive science, a recognition of DST’s associationistic tendency seems called for. This does not imply a weakening of DST’s relevance for the study of cognition, but rather a strengthening of classic associationistic ideas.


Cognitive Science Dynamical System Theory Hebbian Learning Neuronal Group Associationistic Nature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pim Haselager
    • 1
  1. 1.Cognitive ScienceNICI, Katholieke Universiteit NijmegenNijmegenThe Netherlands

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