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The Theory of Instrumental Value: Extensions, Clarifications

  • Marc R. Tool
Part of the Recent Economic Thought book series (RETH, volume 31)

Abstract

Institutional economists have long argued that social value theory is and must be an integral part of economic inquiry. They have recognized that inquiry, addressed directly or indirectly to problem analysis, is purposive in the normative sense. To define an economic problem is to distinguish between “what is” and “what ought to be.” Constructs of social value are employed, then, in identifying the social significance of economic inquiry. In recent years, institutional economists have contributed to a theory of instrumental social value. In this chapter, I explore elements and attributes of this theory of instrumental value and, in particular, present recent extensions and theoretical clarifications of this value theory.

Keywords

Economic Issue Institutional Change Institutional Economic Institutional Analysis Instrumental Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Notes

  1. 1.
    We have noted elsewhere that scholars in critical rhetoric, feminist philosophy of science and literary criticism all grapple with these same issue. See William Waller and Linda Robertson, “Why Johny (Ph.D., Economics) Can’t Read,” Journal of Economic Issues 24, (December 1990): 1027–1044.Google Scholar
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    Charles Whalen, “The Pre-analytic Visions of Institutional Economics,” A paper presented at the annual meetings of the Association of Institutional Thought and the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 28, 1989.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publsihers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc R. Tool
    • 1
  1. 1.California State University, SacramentoSacramento

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