Extreme III: Radical Medicalism

Excuse Abuse
Part of the Clinical Sociology: Research and Practice book series (CSRP)


The blood must have been everywhere. A shotgun at close range is not a delicate instrument. It sprays dozens of pellets that can rip into the flesh, tearing open innumerable capillaries, veins, and arteries. Moreover, the weapon’s blast is such that it can splatter shards of hair, flesh, and sinew over huge areas. Not withstanding all this, not even withstanding the fact that their final shots came from muzzles placed firmly against their parent’s heads, the Menendez brothers, and their lawyers, were able to persuade several jurors at their first trial that this was not murder. Amazingly, although these decision-makers had seen photographs of the devastation (even if some were suppressed as too inflammatory), they still maintained that it was not the fault of those who admitted pulling the triggers.


Moral Judgment Personality Disorder Medical Model Postpartum Depression Sexual Sadism 
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Notes and References

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© Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 1999

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