Abstract
The analysis of the labor-managed firm in this chapter will address the following issues: (i) the right to govern the firm, (ii) the formation and allocation of total revenue of the firm, (iii) the effects of property rights on the firm’s economic behavior, (iv) the role of bank credit, and (v) governmental controls.
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Suggested Readings
Furubotn, E. “The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm,” American Economic Review, 66, 1976.
Furubotn, E. and Pejovich, S. “Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia,” Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 30, 1970.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. “Rights and Production Functions,” Journal of Business, 52, 1979.
Ward, B. “The Firm in Illyria,” American Economic Review, 48, 1958.
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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(1990). The Behavior of the Labor-Managed Firm. In: The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of Comparative Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-28557-3_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-28557-3_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-0878-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-585-28557-3
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