The Behavior of the Labor-Managed Firm

Part of the International Studies in Economics and Econometrics book series (ISEE, volume 22)


The analysis of the labor-managed firm in this chapter will address the following issues: (i) the right to govern the firm, (ii) the formation and allocation of total revenue of the firm, (iii) the effects of property rights on the firm’s economic behavior, (iv) the role of bank credit, and (v) governmental controls.


Capital Good Total Revenue Bank Credit Saving Account Owned Asset 
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Suggested Readings

  1. Furubotn, E. “The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm,” American Economic Review, 66, 1976.Google Scholar
  2. Furubotn, E. and Pejovich, S. “Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia,” Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 30, 1970.Google Scholar
  3. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. “Rights and Production Functions,” Journal of Business, 52, 1979.Google Scholar
  4. Ward, B. “The Firm in Illyria,” American Economic Review, 48, 1958.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

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