Alfred Schutz and the Project of Phenomenological Social Theory
A discussion of Schutz’ phenomenological approach to social theory leads me to some fundamental doubts about his project. Is phenomenology’s central concept, intentionality, conducive to the task of understanding relations among persons? My doubts are expressed through a historical account: I claim the concept of intentionality was devised as a response to questions about the relation between human experience and nature. Applying it to social relations, I argue, may be a case of employing it outside its proper sphere.
KeywordsIntentional Object Modern Philosophy Intentional Relation Causal Principle Causal Order
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