Institutions as a Solution Concept in a Game Theory Context

  • Philip Mirowski
Part of the Recent Economic Thought book series (RETH, volume 8)


In the history of neoclassical economic theory, there have been two major categories of rejoinders to critics of the theory: one, that the critics did not adequately understand the structure of the theory, and thus mistook for essential what was merely convenient; or two, that the criticism was old hat, and had been rendered harmless by recent (and technically abstruse) innovations with which the critic was unacquainted.1 The freedom of passage between these defenses has proven to be the bane of not only those opposed to neoclassicism, but also of those who have felt the need for reform and reformulation of economic theory from within. It has fostered the impression that, with enough ingenuity, any arbitrary phenomenon can be incorporated within the ambit of conventional neoclassical theory, therefore rendering any particular change in “assumptions” as innocuous as any other, and thus rendering them all equally arbitrary.


Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Mixed Strategy Cooperative Game Solution Concept 


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© Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, Boston 1986

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  • Philip Mirowski

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