Property Appropriation and Economic Theory

  • David P. Ellerman
Part of the Recent Economic Thought book series (RETH, volume 8)


There is a major logical gap in neoclassical economic theory. This gap has not been revealed in the debates between neoclassical value theory and alternative theories such as the neo-Ricardian, post-Keynesian, or Marxist value theories. The reason is simple; all these value theories ignore or mis-represent the structure of property appropriation in production. An ac-curate description of the structure of property rights and obligations in production requires not a new value theory, but a different type of theory, property theory.


Competitive Equilibrium Capital Asset Employment Contract Property Theory Capitalist Production 
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© Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, Boston 1986

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  • David P. Ellerman

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