Abstract
The evidence thus far has shown that public ownership confers both cost and price benefits, the latter primarily accruing to residential customers. Similarly, popular election of state utility commissioners is also associated with price reductions to residential users. While in each case either commercial or industrial customers stand to gain a bit from public ownership or popular election, it seems clear that the major beneficiaries of these alternatives to conventional regulation with appointed commissions are residential customers.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(1996). The Political Economy of Ownership and Regulation. In: Power Structure. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-22965-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-22965-2_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-9843-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-585-22965-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive