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The Political Economy of Ownership and Regulation

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Power Structure
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Abstract

The evidence thus far has shown that public ownership confers both cost and price benefits, the latter primarily accruing to residential customers. Similarly, popular election of state utility commissioners is also associated with price reductions to residential users. While in each case either commercial or industrial customers stand to gain a bit from public ownership or popular election, it seems clear that the major beneficiaries of these alternatives to conventional regulation with appointed commissions are residential customers.

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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(1996). The Political Economy of Ownership and Regulation. In: Power Structure. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-22965-2_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-22965-2_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-9843-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-585-22965-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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