Argumentation and Game Theory

  • Iyad Rahwan
  • Kate Larson

In a large class of multi-agent systems, agents are self-interested in the sense that each agent is interested only in furthering its individual goals, which may or may not coincide with others’ goals. When such agents engage in argument, they would be expected to argue strategically in such a way that makes it more likely for their argumentative goals to be achieved. What we mean by arguing strategically is that instead of making arbitrary arguments, an agent would carefully choose its argumentative moves in order to further its own objectives.


Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Social Choice Function Argumentation Framework Normal Form Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.British University in Dubai, UAE & University of EdinburghDubaiUK
  2. 2.University of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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