• Keith L. Dougherty
  • Julian Edward
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 20)


Roughly a half-century has passed since The Calculus of Consent was first published. Yet the questions raised by Buchanan and Tullock’s pioneering book seem to be more relevant today than they were in 1962. The spread of democracy, advances in technology, and population growth have increased the demand for new constitutions. Since The Calculus of Consent was written, more than half of the 160 countries in the world have thrown out their old constitution and adopted an entirely new one. Some have done so more than once (Goldwin and Kaufman, 1988, p. vii).


Public Choice Social Choice Majority Rule Pareto Optimality Vote Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of GeorgiaAthensUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsFlorida International UniversityMiamiUSA

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