Abstract
The non-tradable shares reform has changed the market segmentation problem that has puzzled the Chinese stock market for more than 15 years, because of which large shareholders of listed companies changed their past behaviors, which led to a dramatic improvement in firms’ performance. This chapter will appraise such impacts through theoretical and empirical models, indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of the non-tradable shares reform, and provide a guideline for further improvement in the functions of market mechanisms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, James Wuh Lin, 2000, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. (1), 81˜ –106.
Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim, 2002, Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups, The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2695–2740.
Michael J. Barclar, Clifford G. Holderness, 1989, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 371–395.
Morten Bennedsen, Daniel Wolfenzon, 2000, The Balance of Power in Close Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 113–139.
Harold Demsetz, Kenneth Lehn, 1985, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, The Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155–1177.
Amy Dittmara, Jan Mahrt-Smith, 2007, Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 599–634.
Alexander Dyck, Luigi Zingales, 2004, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison: The Journal of Finance,VOL.LIX, 2, 537–600.
Clifford G. Holderness, 2003, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 51–64.
Cao Honghui, 2002, Study on the efficiency of China’s capital markets, Economics Sciences Publishing House, Beijing.
Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Tunneling, The American Economic Review, 90(2), 22–27.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, 2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, The Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147–1170.
Stephen D. Prowse, 1992, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, The Journal of Finance, 47(3).
Ding ShouHai, 2007, Positive Analysis of Equity Disparting Reform, Economic Theory and Economic Management, 1, 54–59.
Xu XinZhong, Huang Zhang KAI, Liu Yin, Xue Tong, 2006, An Empirical Study on The Pricing of Block Shares in China, Economic Research, 1, 101–108.
Tang ZongMing, Jiang Wei, 2002, A Study on the Expropriation Degree of Large Shareholders of China's Listed Companies, Economic Research, 4, 44–50.
Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995, Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control, Review of Economic Studies, 62(2), 161–185.
Acknowledgments
We thank Quan Wei, Ph.D. candidate at Cornell University, for translation assistance.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cao, H., Liu, H. (2009). An Appraisal of the Impacts of Non-tradable Shares Reform on Large Shareholders’ Behavioral Modes of Listed Companies in the A-Share Market. In: Barth, J., Tatom, J., Yago, G. (eds) China’s Emerging Financial Markets. The Milken Institute Series on Financial Innovation and Economic Growth, vol 8. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93769-4_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93769-4_21
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-93768-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-93769-4
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)