Abstract
South Korea has recalled ambassadors only four times in its modern history – three times from Japan. The latest recall in July 2008 followed Japan’s renewed claim to the Dokdo Islands in a new guideline for junior high school teachers and textbook publishers. The islands are de facto controlled by South Korea, but Japan does not recognize South Korea’s de jure sovereignty over the islands.1 The Lee Myung-bak administration, which has made improving ties with Japan a major policy goal, said it was an “intolerable act” that Japan restated its territorial claim (The New York Times, July 15, 2008).
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Notes
- 1.
The Dokdo Islands consist of two tiny, barely habitable rocky islets surrounded by 33 smaller rocks and reefs. As illustrated in Map. 4.1, they are located about 50 nautical miles east of South Korea’s Ullung Island and about 90 nm northwest of Japan’s Oki Islands. Their approximate total surface area is 0.186 square kilometers (56 acres) (Lovmo 2002).
- 2.
While there is historical evidence that the islands were occasionally visited by Japanese fishermen harvesting abalone and sea lions, Japan’s fundamental legal claim stems from February 22, 1905 when the government of Shimane Prefecture issued Notification Decree #40 which placed the islands under the administrative control of its local authorities in the Oki Islands. The prefecture’s decree was based on the Decision of Parliament (January 28, 1905) concerning the Territorial Incorporation of Takeshima which was claimed to be terra nullius – uninhabited land exhibiting no evidence of being in the possession of any other country (Park 1969: 79–80).
- 3.
The Koreans lay their claim to Dokdo based on earlier and numerous precedents than Japan. They point to the document that named it as a territory that was first incorporated into the Shilla Dynasty in 512 AD. They also point to ancient land surveys and maps that show the islands within Korean territory. The Koreans also complain that the Japanese took advantage of Korea’s political weakness vis-à-vis Japan in 1905, when the islands were registered as a part of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. As of 1905, Japan had already taken control of the foreign affairs of Korea via the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, the ratification of which had been forced on Korea by the Japanese colonialists without the endorsement by King Kojong (1852–1919) (Lovmo 2002).
- 4.
General MacArthur’s Directives to the Japanese Government, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) 1033, June 22, 1946. SCAPIN 677 of January 29, 1946 also detached Dokdo from Japan.
- 5.
On January 18, 1952, upon the impending abolition of the MacArthur Line, the Syngman Rhee government (1948–1960) declared the Peace Line (or Rhee Line) to include Dokdo within South Korean territory, as well as to delineate the zone of maritime defense and fishing in South Korea’s favor. This delimitation ran 60 nm on average from the South Korean coast and 170 nm at its farthest point. The Peace Line effectively excluded Japanese fishermen from some of the richest fishing grounds in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, and was taken by Japan as the equivalent of declaring war against Japan (Park 1983b: 62; Day 1987: 338; Cha 1996: 130).
- 6.
This practice, which started in September 1953, reached a climax in August 1955. For example, during the single week of August 3–9, 1955, eleven Japanese vessels with 266 men on board were seized and four more fired on by the South Korean maritime forces (Keesing’s Record of World Events, April 1960).
- 7.
SCAPIN 1778 established the Dokdo Islands as an aerial bombing range on September 16, 1947. The physical dangers arising from this status was demonstrated by an incident near the islands in June 1948 when sixteen Korean fishermen were killed and four of their boats were destroyed by U.S. Air Force planes engaged in bombing practice (Lovmo 2002).
- 8.
In a provocative show of will to reinforce its territorial claim, South Korea took physical control of the islands in July 1954 by stationing a small number of garrison guards. In the following months and years, South Korea and Japan continued to clash over the islands, exchanging gun and mortar fire on a number of occasions (Day 1987: 338).
- 9.
In particular, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1948–54) held not only negative images of Korea but also an intense personal dislike of Rhee. He once referred to Koreans living in Japan as “insects in the stomach of a lion with the potential to kill the lion itself if not checked” (Lee 1985: 176). Such negative attitudes were further exacerbated by a Japanese superiority complex towards the Koreans. The prewar Japanese militarists and intellectuals disguised their expansionist ambitions as pan-Asianism, while implicitly regarding the neighboring countries as inferior. Despite cultural affinity with their colonial peoples, the Japanese disparaged them for failing to modernize as effectively as the Japanese did (Bridges 1993: 25).
- 10.
Eventually an agreement was signed in Tokyo on December 31, 1957, whereby 850 Japanese fishermen who had completed their sentences would be sent back to Japan; 100 more would be sent back on completing their sentences; in exchange, 460 South Koreans detained in Japan who had lived there before 1945 would be released or allowed to remain in Japan; and 1,100 illegal immigrants would be deported to South Korea. It was also agreed that formal negotiations on the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, trade, fisheries, and problems concerning Koreans in Japan should begin in Tokyo on March 1, 1958 (Keesing’s Record of World Events, April 1960).
- 11.
The Kim–Ohira memorandum states: (1) Japan would pay $300 million as a grant over the following 10 years; (2) Japan would loan a further $200 million, from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, over the following 10 years with a repayment schedule of 20 years at 3.5% interest deferred for 7 years; and (3) Japan would arrange for private loans over $100 million through its Ex-Im Bank (Lee 1995a: 124–5).
- 12.
To do Kim justice, the idea of bombing away the islands was not new. At a preliminary meeting held on September 3, 1962, Director of the Northeast Asian Division of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yujiro Iseki, told his South Korean counterparts that the Dokdo Islands were useless, so that they could be exploded in order to clear the way for normalization talks. But the underlying intention was to take the issue to the ICJ (Lee 1995a: 80). During the final stage of negotiations, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested visiting President Park in May of 1965 that South Korea and Japan erect a jointly operated lighthouse on the islands, allowing both sides a share of the islands and gradually diffusing the issue. Park responded by saying that “Even if the Dokdo issue is a small one in the diplomatic relations negotiations, it is one that makes one angry…I wish I could bomb the islands out of existence just to solve the problem” (Yonhap News, June 20, 2004).
- 13.
In the early 1960s, the Chinese communist threat loomed large. Beijing’s geopolitical divorce with Moscow, its signing of a mutual defense treaty with North Korea (1961), and its support for Southeast Asian communist movements strongly indicated to U.S. policymakers that an Asian communist front was being consolidated. China’s successful nuclear tests in October 1964 and May 1965, coincided with its aggressive rhetoric on Taiwan, further exacerbated threat perceptions in the rest of the region. The security outlook in Southeast Asia appeared even less promising. In April 1965, U.S. commitments to a deteriorating situation in Indochina became complicated with the decision to send U.S. troops into the conflict (Cha 1996: 131–42).
- 14.
Infuriated, President Park seriously considered severing diplomatic relations with Japan, but discarded that idea primarily due to the huge economic damage that would likely result from such a decision. Park’s sense of diplomatic marginalization, however, led him to launch a secret, indigenous nuclear weapons program in the late 1970s in order to balance against the U.S.–Japan alliance (Chosun Ilbo, January 21, 2005).
- 15.
In addition to the 1965 fishery agreement, South Korea and Japan negotiated two agreements in 1974 in order to deal with exploration and mining rights to areas of their common continental shelves. The northeastern terminus of this boundary lay about 74 nm from the Dokdo Islands, but neither side allowed the sovereignty issue to prevent a delimitation line from being drawn through undisputed areas (Prescott 1985: 242).
- 16.
For instance, Sato Yoshiyuki, head of the Northeast Asian Division of the Japanese Foreign Ministry stated “our country is taking the position that Takeshima is clearly our inherent territory historically and under international law. Our country has strongly protested and presented to Korea the documents explaining in detail that the Korean claim has no basis, but the Korean side does not agree” (Asahi News, March 12, 1978).
- 17.
17 In the meantime, North Korea did not take up the Dokdo issue in particular because its influence did not reach the islands. Nevertheless, North Korea regarded Dokdo as traditionally an inherent Korean territory. On February 11, 1977, a commentary in the state-owned Rodong Shinmun made clear that position and criticized Park’s conciliatory stance on Japan with regard to the territorial issue (Kajimura 1997: 429).
- 18.
In trying to correct the trade imbalance, the South Korean government restricted or completely excluded certain Japanese products from the South Korean market. Under a 1977 government directive to diversify imports, 50 products from Southeast Asian countries were subjected to import approval. Japan was not specifically designated but was the implicit target. In 1980 the list was expanded and the formal restrictions were applied to the country that had been the largest exporter to South Korea in the previous year (i.e., Japan). When, in 1982, Saudi Arabia became the largest import source, this qualification was changed to include the largest import source over the previous 5 years. The length of the list had fluctuated from 162 Japanese products in 1982 to a peak of 344 items in 1988, before falling to a total of 258 in 1991. The problem for the South Korean government was to balance the needs of its own industries for key components and products from Japan against its fears that the Japanese would dominate certain sectors of the domestic market if allowed complete freedom. The Japanese government protested regularly about these restrictions, which it regarded as a violation of GATT principles prohibiting quantitative restrictions, but did nothing to retaliate, since, in practice, Japanese companies were able to get around these restrictions (Bridges 1993: 95–6). This protectionist practice was gradually phased out at the end of the 1990s as a result of the rescue loan package agreement between the IMF and South Korea, which was on the verge of default. Apparently, the elimination of the import diversification rules was influenced by Japan, which was one of the principal patrons of the IMF rescue package for South Korea.
- 19.
The concept of “flying geese” was first used by Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu (1937). Akamatsu found that the process of industrialization in the Japanese Empire in the 1920s and 1930s followed three stages: import of new products, import substitution, and export. This process appeared as an inverse “V” shape, resembling the wild flying geese migrating between Japan and Siberia. Akamatsu’s product cycle theory was used to justify the hierarchically organized division of labor in the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” although Akamatsu confined himself as much as possible to the academic field as a scholar (Korhonen 1994). For the adherents of the flying geese model, South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, and the later developers Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the 1990s, grew rapidly as a result of technology and process transfer through the investment and outsourcing of Japanese companies, as these companies followed low-cost production in the later stages of product cycles (Yamazawa 1990; Petri 1993).
- 20.
In a similar vein, Hatch and Yamamura (1996) argue that East Asia benefited significantly in the short run from Japanese capital and technology exports, but might suffer in the long run as “embraced development” gave way to “captive development.” According to Hatch and Yamamura, both statistical and anecdotal data indicate that the once benevolent “lead goose” became a “stingier bird,” which was only concerned about replicating its domestic system of hierarchical and potentially exploitative keiretsu networking in the region as a whole. As T. J. Pempel (1997) notes, an increasingly integrated East Asia became highly dependent on Japan at its center by the end of 1980s.
- 21.
The UNCLOS does not provide obligatory mechanisms in case of EEZ delimitation and territorial disputes. Article 11 of UNCLOS stipulates that disputes be resolved by peaceful and coordinated diplomatic efforts. In case EEZs overlap, Article 74(1) stipulates that states reach an “equitable solution.” Article 74(3) proposes, in case of prolonged state-to-state negotiations on EEZ delimitation, that states adopt a provisional memorandum until they reach a final agreement. From this point of view, the goal of “equitable solution” is to take account of all the “relevant circumstances” which characterize a particular area, circumstances which might be geographical or geomorphological. Some view that the solution can be achieved by drawing an adjusted median line, with due respect to the circumstances in question, even though this is by no means a rule, as noted by the ICJ in 1982 (Dupuy and Vignes 1991: 13).
- 22.
Later that year, Ikeda provided another catalyst for territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands by stating “Senkakus have always been Japan’s territory; Japan already effectively governs the islands, so the territorial issue does not exist.” See Chapter 5 of this book for details.
- 23.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ministry of Foreign Affairs before 1998) is involved in handling the day-to-day administration of relations with Japan, and has essentially acted as the voice of reason in disputes with Japan, which often endangers its position in the “politics of patriotism.” As in the case of Japan, the increasing complexity of issues on the international agenda has given the growing range of ministries a say in foreign policymaking. Aside from the Presidential Office, the Ministry of Defense is deeply involved in the security dimension of South Korea–Japan relationship, particularly regarding the Dokdo dispute and issues of territorial waters. On foreign economic policy, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Ministry of Finance and Economy before 2008) has acted as a very powerful voice, especially through using its enormous institutional and budgetary power over inputs from other economic ministries such as the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy before 2008), and the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.
- 24.
Under the “flag state” principle, the 1965 fishery agreement did not permit the Japanese maritime police to seize South Korean fishing boats even if they had violated Japanese territorial waters. The UNCLOS replaced the flag state principle with the “coastal state” principle, giving the legal authority to monitor and regulate illegal fishing by foreign vessels in its EEZ (Bong 2002: 122–3).
- 25.
Japan’s postwar politics can be characterized by the so-called “1955 System” in which the ruling LDP enjoyed an unbroken clear majority over the opposition parties from 1955 to 1993. In the resultant “embedded mercantilism” in Pempel’s (1998) terms, the LDP not only gained diffuse electoral support through rapid economic growth itself, but also it earned hard votes by distributing material compensation to favored constituent groups, notably farmers and small businesses, through protection, subsidies and public works spending (Pempel 1998; Vogel 1999). Some scholars argue that the pressures of political scandal and economic downturn in the 1990s have not really changed in the conservative governance system (Johnson 1996). In sharp contrast, Pempel (1998) argues that by the early 1990s, the conservative regime could no longer respond well to domestic and international problems. Vogel (1999) takes a middle ground by arguing that despite enormous pressures for reform, the mercantilist legacy continues to slow the pace and shape the content of Japan’s political and economic reforms today.
- 26.
Furthermore, the collapse of left-wing parties in the 1990s left contemporary Japanese politics dominated almost exclusively by center-right political alignments. In the post-Cold War era devoid of the constraining influences of anti-nationalist left-wing political parties or social movements, a consensus about a “Japan that can say no” and that seeks to become “a normal country” increasingly became appealing to many Japanese nationalists (Launius 2002). Although only a handful in number, the nationalist right-wing groups have been well organized and well financed, and thereby overrepresented in Japanese politics.
- 27.
In defiance of the Foreign Ministry’s opposition, for example, Yi In Che, one of many promising candidates, flew to Dokdo and presented three big South Korean national flags and a plaque reading “Dokdo is our land” (Chosun Ilbo, November 17, 1997).
- 28.
The U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration issued after the April 1996 Clinton–Hashimoto summit in Tokyo expanded Japan’s role in the case of emergency in the Korean peninsula. This emergency clause stipulated close coordination between the U.S. and Japan without requiring consultation with South Korea. In reaction, the South Korean government issued a statement urging the two countries to increase transparency in delineating the limits and requirements for U.S.–Japanese defense cooperation that would affect South Korean sovereign rights and the stability of the Korean peninsula (Bong 2002: 106–13).
- 29.
In February 1998, Kim announced that he would pursue the “Sunshine Policy” with North Korea, in hopes of encouraging greater discussion and cooperation with Pyongyang. The policy was inspired by the old Aesop’s fable about the sun getting more results than the fierce wind. In December 2000, the Norwegian Nobel Committee, in recognition of Kim’s “extraordinary and lifelong works for democracy and human rights in South Korea and East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular,” awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize.
- 30.
Some Japanese Foreign Ministry officials were quoted as saying that “Tokyo believes the fundamental policies of the Kim Dae Jung administration will be markedly different from those of his predecessor....the different attitude would be apparent in the approach to such sensitive issues as the long-standing territorial dispute over the ownership of the currently Seoul-controlled Takeshima Islands…Kim Young Sam always stuck to his principles and has caused unnecessary friction with us, while Kim Dae Jung is quite knowledgeable about Japan and places importance on practical dialogue” (Daily Yomiuri, February 26, 1998).
- 31.
In addition, the Joint Declaration’s emphasis on “direct” security dialogue and coordination between South Korea and Japan to maintain regional stability marked a significant departure from the 1969 Korea clause and the 1983 Chun–Nakasone joint statement, both of which inherently paved a one-way street of security interest designed by the U.S. and financed by Japan. The Joint Declaration specifically cited North Korean missile development as potentially destabilizing for regional stability, although it stopped short of offering concrete steps for dealing with the missile issue, let alone entering into mutually binding security commitments (Manosevitz 2003: 805–9).
- 32.
The new fishery agreement substantially altered the maritime order in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. First, both governments agreed to apply the “coastal state” principle to illegal fishing within their respective EEZs. Concerning the width of the EEZ, South Korea accepted the Japanese delineation of 35 nm from the baseline of territorial waters. To resolve the problem of overlapping EEZs, both South Korea and Japan agreed to provisionally delimit their overlapping EEZs based upon the 1974 maritime boundary agreement. In particular, both sides agreed to set up two “common water zones,” one in the East Sea/Sea of Japan around the Dokdo Islands and the other near Jeju Island. Yet the solution to the Dokdo problem left ample room for confusion and diverse interpretations because the legal status of the common water zone around Dokdo was not clearly defined (Bong 2002: 149–51).
- 33.
For South Korean fishermen, the new fishery agreement, which went into effect on February 6, 1999, was particularly unacceptable. Double-boat dragnet fishing was completely banned in Japan’s EEZ under the new fishery agreement. The South Korean government also failed to guarantee the rights of cuttlefish fishermen to harvest blowfish in Japan’s EEZ. Angry South Korean fishermen staged strong protests against the fishery agreement in spring 1999. They called for it to be repealed and eventually forced the South Korea’s Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries to resign from his post (The Korea Herald, March 1, 20, 1999). In 2000, the dispute over Southern Kurile mackerel fishing zone put additional strain on overall South Korean–Japanese relations and greatly damaged the credentials of the Kim administration. A national sense of urgency motivated the South Koreans to rally around the flag and to mobilize public pressure on the South Korean government to adopt a more assertive territorial policy (Bong 2002: 157).
- 34.
This was the third time that Dokdo had been featured on South Korean postage stamps. The first issuance in 1954 came two years after President Syngman Rhee announced the Peace Line and was to commemorate the restoration of physical control of the islands. The Japanese government vigorously protested and threatened to send back packages that had the stamp attached. The second issuance in 2002 provoked no reaction from Japan. Later, Japanese government officials said they had not been aware of the second issuance of a Dokdo stamp. As for the third issuance in 2004, a South Korean Post official said, “No questions were raised within our organization this time because no trouble had occurred during the second issuance.” Even the South Korea’s Foreign Ministry had not been informed about the third stamp issuance until it was publicly announced; thereby permitting South Korean diplomats little time to diffuse the problem (Asahi News, February 2, 2004).
- 35.
In fact, Japan Post has been selling customized postage stamps featuring users’ favorite photos since June 2003. In earlier February 2004, a Tokyo citizen asked one of post offices to issue customized postage stamps with “Takeshima” pictures and texts. Japan Post rejected the request but, in a separate decision, decided to issue 300 “Takeshima stamps” ordered by a retailer of stamps and coins. In March 2004, 13 lawmakers of the ruling LDP placed orders with the Tokyo Central Post Office for 1,500 custom-made stamps featuring islands that are disputed between Japan and its neighboring countries. But a post office official told lawmakers that the post office could not decide whether to accept the orders (because it was politically too sensitive) (Japan Economic Newswire, February 19, March 4, 2004).
- 36.
Japanese rightist groups had never tried to directly claim the Dokdo Islands, but the May incident sent an alarming wakeup call to South Korean activists. In late May, five local civil groups announced that they would land on the Japanese Island of Tsushima in protest of the Japanese attempt to land on Dokdo. In the meantime, a South Korean company started daily boat tours around the islands in spite of Japan’s strong protest (Yonhap News, May 29, June 16, 2004).
- 37.
The surprise missile tests were an implicit but strong signal to the U.S. to free up North Korean assets in Macau, thus opening a way for Pyongyang to return to the Six Party Talks without losing face. In previous months, North Korea’s involvement in counterfeiting U.S. dollars and its reaction to the U.S. government’s sanction on a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, which had been linked to money laundering for North Korea, had been halting the fifth round of the Six Party Talks to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis (Aggarwal and Koo 2006: 38).
- 38.
In fact, both South Korea and Japan were increasingly feeling the pressure to cooperate together with the U.S. to achieve a peaceful resolution to the second North Korean nuclear crisis that had been set off in October 2002. For the South Korean government, it became a critical task to persuade both the U.S. and North Korea to abandon their antagonistic, assertive diplomacy against each other (Lee and Moon 2003; Lee 2004). The Koizumi government shared South Korea’s priority to defuse the nuclear tension in the Korean peninsula. In addition, as public opinion in Japan became alarmed at North Korea’s acknowledgment in 2002 of its kidnapping of several Japanese citizens in the past decades, defense and diplomacy began drawing greater public attention. Koizumi spent huge political resources, including his two one-day visits in 2002 and 2004, to resolve the kidnapping issue, for which closer cooperation with South Korea was essential (Cha 2002; Asahi News, December 10, 2002; Japan Economic Newswire, May 22, 2004).
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(2010). The Island and Maritime Disputes in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. In: Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89670-0_4
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