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Quantitative Analysis of East Asian Island Disputes

Part of the The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific book series (PEAP)

Abstract

A number of statistical studies of international peace and conflict have produced many useful and important findings in recent decades.1 Yet few quantitative attempts have been made thus far to focus on East Asian territorial disputes. As one of the first quantitative efforts to yield generalizable knowledge about East Asian territorial disputes, this chapter presents a novel attempt to unravel why and to what extent a given dispute becomes more or less heated over time. More specifically, I examine what factors affect the dual nature of continuity and mutual restraint in the disputes over Dokdo, the Senkakus, the Paracels, and the Spratlys using large N quantitative analysis. In so doing, I assess the empirical accuracy and generalizability of the territorial bargaining game approach and provide groundwork for the qualitative analyses in the following chapters.

Keywords

Gross Domestic Product Ordinary Little Square Bilateral Trade Ordinary Little Square Regression Binary Logistic Regression Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

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