Kuhn–Tucker Conditions

Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 36)


In this chapter, necessary conditions for optimality of solution points in mathematical programming problems will be studied. Because of the orientation of this book to present optimization theory as an instrument for qualitative economic analysis, the theory to be described is not immediately concerned with computational aspects of solution techniques, which can be found in many excellent books on mathematical programming, e.g., [11, 12, 27, 23, 3].


Lagrange Function Marginal Revenue Regulatory Constraint Mathematical Programming Problem Natural Monopoly 
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© Springer-Verlag New York 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVienna University of Economics and Business AdministrationViennaAustria

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