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The Secret Service’s Influence on Criminal Proceedings

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the influence the German secret services have gained on criminal proceedings in the context of the anti-terrorism legislation of recent years. It examines the organizational structure of the services, and their tasks and powers in regard to the investigation of terrorism and other crimes. Because the secret services are not traditional players in the criminal justice system, their possibilities to influence proceedings by cooperating with the police, the prosecution, and the courts are evaluated. The main emphasis is placed on the exchange of information and its constitutional context. Finally, some major problems in criminal proceedings that arise out of the use of information collected by the secret services and their solution by the German judiciary are discussed. The chapter shows that the participation of the secret services substantially changes the way criminal proceedings are conducted, especially in regard to the use of evidence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the following, the terms secret services and (intelligence) agencies will be used interchangeably because there does not exist any clear definition for these terms.

  2. 2.

    Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. For further information, see the website under <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de>.

  3. 3.

    Federal Intelligence Agency. For further information, see the website under <http://www.bundesnachrichtendienst.de>.

  4. 4.

    Military Counter-Intelligence Service. For further information, see the website under <http://www.mad.bundeswehr.de>.

  5. 5.

    State Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

  6. 6.

    Therefore a constitution does not only exist on the federal level but also in the states: each of the 16 states has its own constitution.

  7. 7.

    The BfV is regulated by the Act on the cooperation of the Federal Government and the State Governments concerning the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz” [BVerfSchG]), the BND is regulated by the act on the federal intelligence agency (“Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst” [BNDG]), and the MAD is regulated by the Act on the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (“Gesetz über den militärischen Abschirmdienst” [MADG]). In addition to these acts, the Act on Limitations on the Privacy of correspondence, posts, and telecommunications (“Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses” [G-10]) provides powers to supervise postal and electronic communication.The aforementioned acts are available for free on the website of the collection of German federal statutes hosted by the Federal Ministry of Justice: <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de>.

  8. 8.

    Some scholars regard the acts of the allied occupying powers as constitutional documents. However, these acts became void when Germany regained sovereignty. Whether the constitutional rule of law demands the separation between police and secret services is rather doubtful. Certainly this principle wants to avoid the existence of one omnipotent authority, however, such a requirement can be fulfilled even when police and secret services merge partly.

  9. 9.

    See the yearly report on the secret services by the Federal Ministry of the Interior: Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007, p. 8.

  10. 10.

    Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz – TerrBekG, 9. January 2002, BGBl. I S. 361. The statute was amended in 2007 by the Act amending the fight against terrorism act (Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetzes, Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz [TerrBekErgG]), 5. January 2007, BGBl. I S. 2.

  11. 11.

    The requirement of current danger (konkrete Gefahr) is important in German (police) law. Only if current danger is given, may the police take investigative and coercive measures. If a situation does not reach the level of current danger, the authorities are not allowed to take such measures.

  12. 12.

    See http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundesnachrichtendienst.

  13. 13.

    Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007, p. 8.

  14. 14.

    It is disputed if section 8 para. 2 BVerfGSchG is merely a description of different measures (Droste 2007: 265) or if it describes the powers of the BfV (Gusy 1991). The correct answer is between these positions: section 8 para. 2 BVerfGSchG gives the BfV the power to use certain measures as long as there is no intensive encroachment on fundamental rights. In case of an intensive encroachment on fundamental rights, a special parliamentary regulation is needed.

  15. 15.

    Section 8 para. 2 BVerfSchG provides that an internal guideline shall enumerate the measures. The guideline has been issued (Rose-Stahl 2006: 70) but it is not publicly available.

  16. 16.

    Secret services’ information system.

  17. 17.

    The court did not base its decision on the separation of police and secret services but mainly on the grave infringement of individual rights.

  18. 18.

    To speak of the police is a simplification because there are numerous police authorities in Germany. The police have two main functions: the preventive function to fight threats to public security and the repressive function to investigate crimes. For each function there exists a different legal framework. Preventive measures are primarily regulated in special state and federal police laws (Polizeigesetze), whereas repressive measures are regulated in the code of criminal procedure (StPO). There are different two categories of police officers: officers that are so-called investigators working for the prosecution (Ermittlungsbeamte der Staatsanwaltschaft) who are endowed special investigative powers, and there are all the other officers who only have a limited set of investigative powers. The main police power rests with the states. But there are also several federal police authorities. The most important federal police authorities are the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA]) and the Federal Police (Bundespolizei, formerly the Federal Border Police, Bundesgrenzschutz). According to the two functions, the state police are often organized in two different ways: the protective police (Schutzpolizei) and the criminal police (Kriminalpolizei). In general only the criminal police deals with crimes. As far as the following text speaks of the police, primarily the police in its repressive function is referred to.

  19. 19.

    This right itself is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution but derived from art. 1 para. 1 GG (human dignity – Menschenwürde) in conjunction with art. 2 para. 1 (general freedom to act – Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit).

  20. 20.

    The German Federal Supreme Court regularly follows a three-step examination when it considers the legality of measures by public authorities: First, does the measure affect the scope (Schutzbereich) of the fundamental right in question? Second, is the measure an infringement (Eingriff) of the right? Third, is there a justification (Rechtfertigung) because the measure aims at the protection of other fundamental rights or constitutional values?

  21. 21.

    The Federal Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG]) is the central piece of legislation concerning data protection. It regulates the collection and storing of data in general and provides for special mechanism of protection (e.g. the control by data protection commissioners). The act is supplemented by specific regulations: e.g. regulations within the statutes governing the secret services, within the police statutes, or within the code of criminal procedure.

  22. 22.

    See art. 35 para. 1 GG (administrative assistance between federal and state authorities) as well as section 4 of the federal administrative procedure act (Bundesverwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) and the similar regulations in the state administrative procedure acts (Landesverwaltungsverfahrensgesetze).

  23. 23.

    Administrative assistance is only possible when the following preconditions are fulfilled: A request for assistance must be limited to a special part of an ongoing proceeding. It is not allowed to ask another authority to take over whole proceedings. The requesting authority is also not allowed to extend its tasks and powers just by asking another authority to do it (Lisken and Denninger 2007: 388; Schlink 1982: 108); it is limited to file a request that is within its own tasks and powers. Equally the requested authority can only act within its own tasks and powers, it cannot borrow powers from the requesting authority. The requested authority is bound by the request and is not allowed to make decisions on its own, it is just the “extended arm” of the requesting authority.

  24. 24.

    Schünemann (2008) denies a right of the secret services to transmit information to the police if it does not concern serious crimes against the state because of the principle of separation between secret services and the police. Yet this understanding would be against the clear wording of section 19 para. 1 BVerfSchG, section 9 para. 1 BNDG (see also Droste 2007: 519).

  25. 25.

    See also Stock and Herz, this volume.

  26. 26.

    See the Act on the establishment of a standardised central anti-terrorism-file for federal and state police and secret services (Gesetz zur Errichtung einer standardisierten zentralen Antiterrordatei von Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten von Bund und Ländern, Antiterrordateigesetz [ATDG]), 22 December 2006, BGBl. I S. 3409.

  27. 27.

    Federal Criminal Police Office.

  28. 28.

    The only exception is the possibility of the federal attorney general (Generalbundesanwalt) to use information of the Anti-Terrorism File via the participating police institutions (section 6 para. 4 ATDG). However, this is only a mediated kind of participation and does not include the state prosecution that is in principle responsible for the prosecution of the crimes mentioned in the ATDG.

  29. 29.

    BKAG – Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamts und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten (Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office and the cooperation of the federation and the states in criminal matters).

  30. 30.

    For information on and by the Federal data protection commissioner, see the website under <http://www.bfdi.bund.de>.

  31. 31.

    In addition to German officers, officials of Europol and the FBI participated; see the description of the German government in response to a parliamentary inquiry BT-Drs. 16/892.

  32. 32.

    Joint anti-terrorism centre.

  33. 33.

    The police division is called the Polizeiliche Informations- und Analysestelle (PIAS) and accordingly the secret service division is called Nachrichtendienstliche Informations- und Analysestelle (NIAS).

  34. 34.

    Joint Internet Center.

  35. 35.

    An exception is made in cases of serious crimes where the “Failure to Report Planned Crimes” constitutes a crime itself (see section 138 StGB). In this case the discretion is reduced to zero (Borgs-Maciejewski and Ebert 1986: § 3 BVerfSchG para. 38; Singer 2002: 63).

  36. 36.

    The guidelines for proceedings in criminal matters and matters of administrative offences (Richtlinien für das Strafverfahren und das Bußgeldverfahren [RiStBV]) are no statutes but internal administrative regulations issued by the federal and state ministries of justice. Nonetheless the guidelines are binding for the prosecution.

  37. 37.

    The case is still under investigation therefore not all facts are clarified. The facts in the text are based on the information given by Sieber 2008 and Trüg and Habetha 2008.

  38. 38.

    The question following this conclusion is whether the information received can be used in criminal proceedings. Assuming that the acquisition of the information was illegal, the information as such would probably not be allowed as evidence in court. However, any information gathered just as a consequence of the original information would probably not be banned as evidence, because the German system does not now a general fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine (see below under Sect. 16.4.3).

  39. 39.

    Because the police have received powers in recent decades to conduct investigations in secret, some of the problems depicted in the text also apply to the use of evidence collected by the police.

  40. 40.

    The personnel of the secret services can work as undercover agents who observe certain persons on a long-term basis. They can also just work on a single case and are then called undercover investigators (Verdeckte Ermittler, see section 110a StPO). There is also the possibility that employees have no special cover and just observe a person secretly. Individuals who work for the agencies are called informants if they just provide information (Informant, see no. 2.1 RiStBV annex D). Individuals who work for the agencies on a long-term basis in order to investigate crimes are called confidants (Vertrauensperson, V-Person, see no. 2.2 RiStBV annex D).

  41. 41.

    The statement of any other authority, for example the prosecution that wants to keep the names of informants confidential, is of no relevance for the court (BGH NStZ 2001, 333).

  42. 42.

    The least protection during the main hearing offers the possibility not to reveal the place of residence (section 68 para. 2 StPO). More protection is given by not revealing the identity or just by giving an old or fake identity (section 68 para. 3 StPO). However, the person is still visible in the courtroom and could be identified later by the accused or an auditor. If there is a concrete threat to the health of a witness, the accused can be removed from the courtroom (section 247 StPO, see BGHSt 32, 32). However, in this case the accused gets to know the identity of the witness, so that it only makes sense when the witness is intimidated by the accused. A step further is the exclusion of the public, which requires a threat for life, liberty, or freedom of the witness (section 172 GVG). But in this case the accused also gets to know the identity of the witness. Similar problems arise when the witness is interviewed outside the courtroom by means of a video conference (sections 247a StPO) or that the video of an earlier questioning is shown (section 58a StPO).

  43. 43.

    In a later decision the BGH has ruled that if the defence nonetheless gets to know the date and place of the examination and shows up, they have the right to participate in the questioning (BGHSt 32, 115). However, not all details are clarified yet.

  44. 44.

    The classic mechanisms to obtain the evidence are international judicial assistance or mutual cooperation (internationale Rechtshilfe). These aspects will not be examined any further in this context. The assistance can vary greatly, especially when EU countries are asked for help, because there already exists an extensive legal network for the exchange of information within the EU or parts of the EU.

    The involvement of German authorities abroad is obviously hard to prove. Information is often kept secret. If information becomes public it is mainly too general in order to be brought forward in a criminal proceeding. For example, it has become public that German secret service agents took part in interrogations in Guantanamo (see Hetzer 2006). However, as long as this participation cannot be connected to the interrogation of a specific person, the complaint that a statement was reached in circumvention of German law is unsuccessful.

  45. 45.

    The involvement of German authorities abroad is obviously hard to prove. Information is often kept secret. If information becomes public it is mainly too general in order to be brought forward in a criminal proceeding. For example, it has become public that German secret service agents took part in interrogations in Guantanamo (see Hetzer 2006). However, as long as this participation cannot be connected to the interrogation of a specific person, the complaint that a statement was reached in circumvention of German law is unsuccessful.

  46. 46.

    Besides section 136a StPO, the court discussed the UN anti-torture treaty, to which Germany is a signatory and which is directly applicable in Germany (OLG Hamburg, NJW 2005, 2326). Any evidence based on torture is not allowed in a criminal proceeding (art. 15).

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Appendixes

Appendixes

1.1 Decisions

In the following, judicial decisions mentioned in the text are listed chronologically supplemented by date and case number. The citations are based primarily on the official collections (BVerfGE, BGHSt, BVerwGE) or on the reprint of the decisions in legal publications (NJW, NStZ, StV). Many of the decisions are also available online.

Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court since 1998 are available online without charge (https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html). The judgements can be found on the basis of the date and the case number (Table 18.1).

Table 18.1 Decisions of the BVerfG

Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice are available online from 2000 onwards without charge (http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de). The judgements can be found on the basis of the date and the case number (Table 18.2).

Table 18.2 Decisions of the BGH

Decisions of the federal administrative court are available online from 2002 onwards only. Older decisions can be ordered via the website of the court for a small fee (http://www.bundesverwaltungsgericht.de/). The judgement mentioned in the text can be found on the basis of the date and the case number (Table 18.3).

Table 18.3 Decision of the BVerwG

Decisions of the higher regional court of Hamburg (OLG Hamburg) are available online from 2004 onwards without charge (http://lrha.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/ha_frameset.py). The judgement mentioned in the text can be found on the basis of the date and the case number (Table 18.4).

Table 18.4 Decision of the OLG Hamburg

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Engelhart, M. (2010). The Secret Service’s Influence on Criminal Proceedings. In: Wade, M., Maljevic, A. (eds) A War on Terror?. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89291-7_19

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