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SERENITY Aware System Development Process

  • Daniel Serrano
  • Antonio Maña
  • Rafael  Llarena
  • Beatriz Gallego-Nicasio Crespo
  • Keqin Li
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 45)

Abstract

Traditionally, security patterns have successfully been used to describe security and dependability. In the SERENITY Project the notion of security and dependability (S&D) pattern has been extended to exact specifications of re-usable security mechanisms for Ambient Intelligence (AmI) systems. These S&D Patterns include information on the security properties satisfied by the solution and on the context conditions to be fulfilled. This chapter presents the development of applications supported by SERENITY. In the context of SERENITY we refer to these applications as Serenity-aware applications. Firstly, this chapter presents the Serenity-aware application design using S&D Artefacts. Secondly, it proposes a Java Application Programming Interface (API) to be used in the application development. And, finally, it introduces the development of an example Serenity-aware application.

Keywords

Application Program Interface Security Requirement Sequence Diagram Ambient Intelligence Type String 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Serrano
    • 1
  • Antonio Maña
    • 2
  • Rafael  Llarena
    • 3
  • Beatriz Gallego-Nicasio Crespo
    • 4
  • Keqin Li
    • 5
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of MalagaMalagaMálaga
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of MalagaMalagaMálaga
  3. 3.Atos OriginMadrid
  4. 4.Atos OriginMadrid
  5. 5.SAP Research SRC Sophia AntipolisMouginsFrance

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