Ceremonial Dimensions of Market-Based Pollution Control Instruments: The Clean Air Act and the Cap-and-Trade Model

  • Steven R. Bolduc


Market-based pollution control instruments represent the influence of a commitment to the principle of laissez-faire economics and the success of orthodox economics to steer public policy formation. The criteria for design and assessment of policy interventions however should not be influenced by a prior commitment to a problem-solving strategy. Rather, the inquiry guiding policy design and assessment should be guided by the recognition of social, ecological, and technological interdependence and by the discovery of evaluative criteria consistent with this interdependence.


Governance Process Mercury Emission Evaluative Criterion Participatory Democracy Social Belief 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven R. Bolduc
    • 1
  1. 1.Minnesota State UniversityMoorheadUSA

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