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A Non-Intrusive Approach to Enhance Legacy Embedded Control Systems with Cyber Protection Features

  • Shangping Ren
  • Nianen Chen
  • Yue Yu
  • Pierre Poirot
  • Kevin Kwiat
  • Jeffrey J.P. Tsai
Chapter

Trust is cast as a continuous re-evaluation: a system’s reliability and security are scrutinized, not just prior to, but during its deployment. This approach to maintaining trust is specifically applied to distributed and embedded control systems. Unlike general purpose systems, distributed and embedded control systems, such as power grid control systems and water treatment systems, etc., generally have a 24x7 availability requirement. Hence, upgrading or adding new cyber protection features into these systems in order to sustain them when faults caused by cyber attacks occur, is often difficult to achieve and inhibits the evolution of these systems into a cyber environment. In this chapter, we present a solution for extending the capabilities of existing systems while simultaneously maintaining the stability of the current systems. An externalized survivability management scheme based on the observe-reason-modify paradigm is applied, which decomposes the cyber attack protection process into three orthogonal subtasks: observation, evaluation and protection. This architecture provides greater flexibility and has a resolvability attribute- it can utilize emerging techniques; yet requires either minimal modifications or even no modifications whatsoever to the controlled infrastructures. The approach itself is general and can be applied to a broad class of observable systems.

Keywords

Evaluation Module Finite State Machine Decision Unit Inference Engine Water Treatment System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shangping Ren
    • 1
  • Nianen Chen
    • 1
  • Yue Yu
    • 1
  • Pierre Poirot
    • 1
  • Kevin Kwiat
    • 2
  • Jeffrey J.P. Tsai
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Illinois Institute of TechnologyChicago
  2. 2.AFRL
  3. 3.Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at ChicagoChicago

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