Improved Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems

  • Gyözö Gódor
  • Mátyás Antal
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 284)

The usage of the RFID technology is becoming more and more widespread, however, the systems are quite vulnerable regarding security aspects.The authentication protocols developed for computer networks are not suitable for RFID use, because the tags have very limited memory and computing capacity. New solutions are needed, which requires less operations and fewer messages. The lightweight protocols are one of the currently known methods for this purpose, but the proposed algorithms do not satisfy all of the security requirements. In this paper we introduce our lightweight authentication protocol, which provides prevention against all known attack schemes. We provide a full security analysis and prove the correctness of our solution with formal verification using GNY logics.


Hash Function Mobile Networking Authentication Protocol Mutual Authentication Memory Block 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gyözö Gódor
    • 1
  • Mátyás Antal
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of TelecommunicationBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsBudapestHungary

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