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The Market for Corporate Control in Developing Economies

  • Robert W. McGee

Keywords

Corporate Governance Stock Price Corporate Control Shareholder Wealth Fiduciary Duty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science +Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert W. McGee
    • 1
  1. 1.Florida International UniversityMiamiUSA

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