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The Market for Corporate Control in Developing Economies

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Corporate Governance in Developing Economies

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

    Robert W. McGee

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  1. Florida International University 3000 NE., 151st Street, North MiamiFL 33181, USA

    Robert W. McGee

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McGee, R.W. (2009). The Market for Corporate Control in Developing Economies. In: McGee, R.W. (eds) Corporate Governance in Developing Economies. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-84833-4_8

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