Traffic Flow Confidentiality in IPsec: Protocol and Implementation

  • Csaba Kiraly
  • Simone Teofili
  • Giuseppe Bianchi
  • Renato Lo Cigno
  • Matteo Nardelli
  • Emanuele Delzeri
Part of the IFIP — The International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 262)


Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) mechanisms are techniques devised to hide/masquerade the traffic pattern to prevent statistical traffic analysis attacks. Their inclusion in widespread security protocols, in conjunction with the ability for deployers to flexibly control their operation, might boost their adoption and improve privacy of future networks. This paper describes a TFC protocol integrated, as a security protocol, in the IPsec security architecture. A Linux-based implementation has been developed, supporting a variety of perpacket treatments (padding, fragmentation, dummy packet generation, and artificial alteration of the packet forwarding delay), in an easily combinable manner. Experimental results are reported to demonstrate the flexibility and the effectiveness of the TFC implementation.


Packet Size Control Logic Packet Delay Security Protocol Traffic Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Csaba Kiraly
    • 1
  • Simone Teofili
    • 2
  • Giuseppe Bianchi
    • 2
  • Renato Lo Cigno
    • 1
  • Matteo Nardelli
    • 1
  • Emanuele Delzeri
    • 2
  1. 1.University of TrentoItaly
  2. 2.University of Rome Tor VergataItaly

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