Electoral Accountability, Credible Commitments, and Distributive Pressures
  • Dino Falaschetti
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 14)

Early on, Madison appreciated the fundamental difficulties that an accountable democracy must contend with and perhaps the impossibility of addressing those difficulties in a universally appealing manner. Contemporary social scientists formalized Madison’s insights, confirming that these difficulties can indeed create inescapable “quandaries” – choice situations where every alternative contains unpleasant components (Schofield 2008).

For Part I of this book, those choice situations involved how much influence producers and consumers should exercise in deciding an important dimension of competition policy, namely that which governs the US telecommunications sector. There, our quandary involved creating channels through which producers can exercise a stronger policy voice (and thus risking an unproductive increase in what is commonly referred to as economic power) or closing off those channels in a more democratically appealing manner (but facilitating populist takings). Part II of this...


Foreign Direct Investment Monetary Policy Economic Performance Monetary Authority Democratic Governance 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA
  2. 2.Hoover InstituteStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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