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Theory

What Should We Observe if Democratic Governance Weakens Economic Performance?
  • Dino Falaschetti
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 14)

Across social science disciplines, scholars agree that electoral constituents receive poor policy treatment when their political agents lack accountability. V.O. Key’s (1984 [1949]) seminal inquiry, for example, produced evidence that constituents receive inferior treatment when they lack ready access to voting in elections. Extending this early insight, Robert Fleck (1999, 2001) found that depression-era distributive policy favored high-turnout constituencies, whereas Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2002) developed related evidence on government responsiveness in India. Similarly, James Hamilton (1993) reported that politically active North Carolinians faced a significantly reduced probability of having hazardous waste facilities expanded within their counties. In each case, democratic governance appears to have reduced political agency costs, at least for constituents to which relevant institutions encouraged accountability.

Perhaps it is this appearance that motivates democracy...

Keywords

Economic Performance Consumer Surplus Demand Curve Supply Curve Total Surplus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA
  2. 2.Hoover InstituteStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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