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Coordination Strategies and Techniques

  • Abdellah Bedrouni
  • Ranjeev Mittu
  • Abdeslem Boukhtouta
  • Jean Berger
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to providing a broad overview of the various strategies and techniques designed and implemented to enable the coordination of autonomous entities within organizations, processes, and distributed multi-agent systems. In addition, examples are incorporated to illustrate the use of these strategies and techniques in various software implementations and prototypes. Finally, additional issues are discussed in order to help the reader further understand both the potential advantages and limitations of applying such strategies or techniques.

Keywords

Multiagent System Negotiation Process Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Combinatorial Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abdellah Bedrouni
    • 1
  • Ranjeev Mittu
    • 2
  • Abdeslem Boukhtouta
    • 3
  • Jean Berger
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Mechanical & Industrial EngineeringConcordia UniversityMontrealCanada
  2. 2.Head, Intelligent Decision Support Section (Code 5584) Information Technology DivisionU.S. Naval Research LaboratoryWashingtonUSA
  3. 3.Defence Research & Development Canada - ValcartierDecision Support Technology SectionVal-BelairCanada

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