Advertisement

Origin and Functionalities of Regulation

  • André Nijsen
Chapter
Part of the International Studies in Entrepreneurship book series (ISEN, volume 20)

Abstract

To get a full understanding of the phenomenon of compliance costs, we need a sound theory about origin and functionality of regulations. Only if we understand where businesses regulation is coming from, what we want to achieve and by which means, we can combat unnecessary compliance costs of businesses.

A theoretical model about business regulation can be very helpful to understand and answer these questions about origin and functionality. From this model, it appears that different actors are playing an active role in this process of law making, each from their own perspective.

Keywords

Legal Obligation Compliance Cost Administrative Burden Constitutional State Political Democracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. De Beus, J., and Ph. van Praag (2001), De wedergeboorte van de politieke deelname; in De Volkskrant, Reflex, January 6, p. 21RGoogle Scholar
  2. De Swaan, A. (1993), In Care of the State, Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era, Polity , CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Friedrich, C.J. (1963), Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York/San Francisco, pp. 234Google Scholar
  4. Hoogerwerf, A., M.J. Arentsen, and P.J. Klok (1993), Om een aanvaardbaar beleid: Een studie over de maatschappelijke acceptatie van overheidsbeleid, Centrum voor Bestuurskundig Onderzoek en Onderwijs, Faculty Political Science, University of Twente, Enschedé, p. 18Google Scholar
  5. Kip Viscusi, W. (1997), Improving the analytical basis for regulatory decision-making, in: Regulatory Impact Analysis, Best Practices in OECD Countries, OECD/PUMA, Paris, p. 178Google Scholar
  6. Nijsen, A.F.M., (2003), Dansen met de Octopus; Een bestuurskundige visie op informatieverplichtingen van het bedrijfsleven in de sociale rechtstaat (Dancing with the Octopus. Vision from a Public Administration Perspective at the Information Requirements of the Private Sector in a Constitutional State), Eburon/EIM, Delft/Zoetermeer (diss.)Google Scholar
  7. Rousseau, J.J., (2001) Du Contrat Social ou Principes Du Droit Politique, par Bruno Bernardi, GF Flammarion, ParisGoogle Scholar
  8. Stone, C.D., (1975) Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior, Harper and Row, New York, pp. xi, xiiGoogle Scholar
  9. Van Gunsteren, H.R.(1994), Culturen van besturen, Boom, Meppel, pp. 8–9, 21Google Scholar
  10. Westle, B. (1989), Politische Legitimität: Theorien, Konzepte, empirische Befunde, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 22–25Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Adviser Regulatory ReformThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations