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Metagame Strategies of Nation-States, with Application to Cross-Strait Relations

  • Alex Chavez
  • Jun Zhang
Conference paper

Abstract

Metagames (Howard, 1968), a class of formal models in game theory, model the behavior of players who predict each other’s conditional strategies recursively. We present a framework for three-player games based on metagame theory. This framework is well-suited to the analysis of nation-states, especially when the analyst wishes to make few assumptions about the level of recursive reasoning and the preference orderings of players.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Solution Concept Inequity Aversion Conditional Strategy Brute Force Search 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Howard, N. (1968). Theory of Metagames, Ph.D. Thesis , University of London.Google Scholar
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    Thomas, L. C. (1984). Games, Theory and Applications. Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York.MATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alex Chavez
    • 1
  • Jun Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of MichiganUSA

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