Rational Choice Theory: A Forum for Exchange of Ideas between the Hard and Social Sciences in Predictive Behavioral Modeling

  • Sun-Ki Chai
Conference paper


The rational choice model of human behavior provides general assumptions that underlie most of the predictive behavioral modeling done in the social sciences. Surprisingly, despite its origins in the work of eminent mathematicians and computer scientists and its current prominence in the social sciences, there has been relatively little interest among hard scientists in incorporating rational choice assumptions into their agent-based analysis of behavior. It is argued here that doing so will introduce greater theoretical generality into agent-based models, and will also provide hard scientists an opportunity to contribute solutions to known weaknesses in the conventional version of rational choice. This in turn will invigorate the dialogue between social scientists and hard scientists studying social phenomena.


Game Theory Rational Choice Rational Choice Theory Evolutionary Game Theory Hard Scientist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sun-Ki Chai
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of SociologyUniversity of HawaiíHonolulu

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