This chapter contains a proof of a very pretty theorem due to Barry O’Neill that prescribes optimal play (for rational bidders) in the dollar auction from Chapter 6. We prove this theorem in Sections 12.2 and 12.3. In Section 12.4, we explain the sense in which a Vickrey auction is a “generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
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© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
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(2008). More Escalation. In: Mathematics and Politics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77645-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77645-3_12
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
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