Towards a Virtualization-enabled Framework for Information Traceability (VFIT)

  • Ravi Sahita
  • Uday Savagaonkar
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 39)


Automated and targeted attacks to steal sensitive information from computers are increasing in frequency along with the stealthiness of these attacks. Tools for generating attacks on existing Information Technology infrastructure are readily available. These attacks can easily evade detection from today’s countermeasures. Information theft is thus an important threat vector for networked communities where sensitive information is exchanged with partners in different administrative domains, with dissimilar security policies and configurations. The combination of disparately managed networks, ability to store information offline, and remote access functionality complicate the enforcement of information security policies. We tackle the issue of protecting sensitive information by applying a systemintegrity and information-auditing perspective. We believe this is the first step towards mitigating insider abuse of data-use privileges. We present a Virtualization- enabled Framework for Information Traceability (VFIT) to prevent unauthorized handling of sensitive information. We show that this hardware platform on which information is created, transformed and stored is a key enforcement point to provide accountable information flow. We describe the application of our previous work on Virtualization-enabled Integrity Service (VIS) to implement VFIT. Our approach is data-centric and provides a mechanism that can deterministically audit use of information while it is in use in volatile or non-volatile memory. Using this mechanism, we describe how existing network security mechanisms and our proposed framework can be applied to applications to provide traceability for sensitive information in a distributed system.


Virtual Machine Trusted Platform Module Performance Overhead Inside Attack Page Table 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ravi Sahita
    • 1
  • Uday Savagaonkar
    • 1
  1. 1.Communication Technology Lab, Intel CorporationJF3-206, HillsboroU.S.A.

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