This chapter constructs and analyzes a simple auditing model in order to answer questions concerning three principal issues: (i) the information contained in the report, (ii) commitment to the audit policy, and (iii) audit effort. The approach taken is based on the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We attempt to examine the nature of such equilibria and arguments as to which equilibrium one would expect to observe.
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Chatterjee, K., Morton, S., Mukherji, A. (2008). Strategic Audit Policies Without Commitment. In: Chinchuluun, A., Pardalos, P.M., Migdalas, A., Pitsoulis, L. (eds) Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria. Springer Optimization and Its Applications, vol 17. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_15
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