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Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Battle of Sexes Games: A Simulation Study

  • Jijun Zhao
  • Ferenc Szidarovszky
  • Miklos N. Szilagyi
Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 21)

Agent-based simulation is used to examine the N-person prisoner's dilemma and battle of sexes games. The N-person binary state prisoner's dilemma model is extended first to the continuous state, and dynamic extensions are formulated with comformist, Pavlovian, greedy, accountant and influencing agents, where the influence of the media is also taken into consideration. For the N-person battle of sexes games, deterministic and stochastic dynamic models are developed. In all cases the dynamic equations are complicated large-scale nonlinear difference equations, the asymptotical behavior of which can be examined only by using computer simulation. Numerical results are also presented showing the dependence of the state trajectories and limits on model parameters and the initial states.

Keywords

Personality Type State Trajectory Initial Ratio Mutual Defection Preference Ratio 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jijun Zhao
    • 1
  • Ferenc Szidarovszky
    • 2
  • Miklos N. Szilagyi
    • 3
  1. 1.Complexity InstituteQingdao UniversityChina
  2. 2.Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA
  3. 3.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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