Cognitive Biases Affect the Acceptance of Tradeoff Studies

  • Eric D. Smith
  • Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini
  • Terry Bahill
Part of the Springer Optimization and Its Applications book series (SOIA, volume 21)

Tradeoff studies involving human subjective calibration and data updating are often distrusted by decision makers. A review of objectivity and subjectivity in decision making confirms that prospect theory is a good model for actual human decision making. Relationships between tradeoff studies and the elements of experiments in judgment and decision making show that tradeoff studies are susceptible to human cognitive biases. Examples of relevant biases are given. Knowledge of these biases should help give decision makers more confidence in tradeoff studies.


Cognitive Bias Prospect Theory Ambiguity Aversion Human Decision Process Probability Weighting Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eric D. Smith
    • 1
  • Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini
    • 2
  • Terry Bahill
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Engineering Management and Systems EngineeringUniversity of Missouri at RollaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Management and PolicyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA
  3. 3.Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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