RFID Security pp 317-348 | Cite as

Public-Key Cryptography for RFID Tags and Applications

  • Lejla Batina
  • Jorge Guajardo
  • Bart Preneel
  • Pim Tuyls
  • Ingrid Verbauwhede


RFID tags are small wireless devices expected to be pervasive in the future. In addition to their rigorous constraints featuring an extremely low-power budget and small die size, they also give rise to serious security and privacy issues. Typical security services include authentication, key management, and encryption. Although some experts have given up on the feasibility of public-key solutions for RFID, assuming it is too expensive and too power hungry, there exists a firm line of research exploring the limits of compact public-key implementations for RFID devices.

An emerging application is the use of RFID tags for anticounterfeiting by embedding them into a product. Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) offers an attractive solution to the counterfeiting problem and thus, exploring possible implementation options for this application is attractive.

In this chapter, we discuss PKC-based solutions well suited for RFIDs. Our focus is on cryptographic solutions based on elliptic curves. We describe low-cost Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) processors supporting security algorithms and protocols for RFID. We also investigate which PKC-based identification protocols are useful for these anticounterfeiting applications. We argue that identification of RFID tags can reach high security levels. In particular, we elaborate how secure identification protocols based on the DL problem on elliptic curves can be implemented on an RFID tag in a bit more than 10,000 gates. We describe various cases of elliptic curves over F2p with p prime and over composite fields F2 p . Some of the implementations described in this chapter make RFID tags suitable for anticounterfeiting purposes even in the off-line setting. Finally, we compare different implementation options and explore the cost that side-channel attack countermeasures would have on such implementations.


Elliptic Curve Smart Card Elliptic Curf Elliptic Curve Cryptography Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lejla Batina
    • 1
  • Jorge Guajardo
  • Bart Preneel
  • Pim Tuyls
  • Ingrid Verbauwhede
  1. 1.ESAT/COSICKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenBelgium

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