Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy pp 227–263Cite as

The Perspective of Law

  • Chapter

The enlightened conception of the separation of powers holds that law should be made by the legislature, interpreted by the judiciary, and enforced by the executive branch of government. Public choice theory provides a solid foundation for the appraisal of this traditional formula. The findings of public choice theory, while supporting much of the traditional wisdom, pose several challenges to the theoretical foundations of these constitutional principles. In the following pages, I shall revisit these important questions considering the issue of institutional design through the lenses of public choice theory.

This paper is a reprint of an essay that first appeared in The Encyclopedia of Public Choice edited by Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider and published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Volume I, 214–235.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Axelrod, R.M. (1981). ‘‘The emergence of cooperation among egoists.’’ American Political Science Review, 75, 306-318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benson, B.L. (1989). ‘‘The spontaneous evolution of commercial law.’’ Southern Economic Journal, 55, 644-661.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benson, B.L. (1990). The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benson, B.L. (1992). ‘‘Customary law as a social contract: International Commercial Law.’’ Constitutional Political Economy, 3, 1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, P. (1973). ‘‘Logrolling, arrow-paradox and cyclical majorities.’’ Public Choice, 15, 87-95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, L. (1996). ‘‘Merchant law in a merchant court: Rethinking the code’s search for immanent business norms.’’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 1765.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Broder, D.S. (1997). ‘‘Catatonic Politics.’’ Washington Post, November 11, A19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie, I. (1990). Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charney, J.I. (1986). ‘‘The persistent objector rule and the development of customary international law.’’ British Yearbook of International Law, 56, 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R.H. (1960). ‘‘The problem of social cost.’’ Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R.D. (1992). ‘‘Against legal centrism.’’ California Law Review, 81, 425.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R.D. (1994). ‘‘Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: A model of decentralized law.’’ International Review of Law and Economics, 14, 215-231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R.D. (2000). The Strategic Constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R.D. and Rubinfeld, D.L. (1989). ‘‘Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution’’, Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1067-97.

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Amato, A. (1971). The Concept of Custom in International Law. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixit, A. and Olson, M., Jr. (1997). ‘‘Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase theorem’’? (unpublished manuscript on file with the George Mason Law Review).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixon, A.J. (1985). ‘‘Line-item veto controversy.’’ Congressional Digest, 64, 259-282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook, F.H. (1983). ‘‘Statutes’ Domains.’’ University of Chicago Law Review, 50, 533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich, I. and Posner, R.A. (1974). ‘‘An economic analysis of legal rulemaking.’’ Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 257-286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elhauge, E.R. (1991). ‘‘Does interest group theory justify more intrusive judicial review?’’ Law Journal, 101, 31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuller, L.L. (1969). The Morality of Law, Revised Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greif, A. (1989). ‘‘Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: Evidence on the maghribi traders.’’ Journal of Economic History, 49, 857.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J.C. (1955). ‘‘Cardinal welfare individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility.’’ Journal of Political Economy, 63, 315.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, H.L.A. (1961). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, P.L. (1990). ‘‘The politics of unregulation: Public choice and limits on government.’’ Cornell Law Review, 75(101), 280-312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen, H. (1939). ‘‘Théorie du Droit international Coutumier.’’ Revue Internationale de la The´orie du Droit, 1(New Series), 263.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kontou, N. (1994). The Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1975). ‘‘The independent judiciary in an interest-group perspective.’’ Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 875-901.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leibenstein, H. (1982). ‘‘The prisoners’ dilemma in the invisible hand: An analysis of intrafirm productivity.’’ American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 72, 92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, M.E. and Plott, C.R. (1977). ‘‘Agenda influence and its implications.’’ Virginia Law Review, 63, 561.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Long, C. and Rose-Ackerman, S (1982). ‘‘Winning the contest by agenda manipulation.’’ Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2, 123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mateesco, N.M. (1947). La Coutume dans les Cycles Juridiques Internationaux. Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, N.R. (1977). ‘‘Logrolling, vote trading and the paradox of voting: A game theoretical overview.’’ Public Choice, 30, 51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1997). ‘‘The coase theorem is false?’’ Paper presented at American Law and Economics Association annual conference held in May 1997, Toronto, Canada.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (1995a). ‘‘Private property and social costs.’’ European Journal of Law and Economics, 2,149-173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (1995b). ‘‘Toward a theory of spontaneous law.’’ Constitutional Political Economy, 6, 211-231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (1997a). ‘‘The cost of the game: A topology of social interactions.’’ European Journal of Law and Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (1997b). ‘‘The economics of customary law: Lessons from evolutionary socio-biology,’’ in B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (eds.) The Production of Law: Essays in Law and Economics. Antwerpen: Maklu Publisher.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (2000). ‘Spontaneous emergence of law: customary law’ Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Edited by R. Posner and F. Parisi, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 603-630.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penny, T.J. (1997). ‘‘Pork is safe from this president’s line-item vetoes.’’ Wall Street Journal, November 13, A22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, E. (1996a). ‘‘Law, economics, and inefficient norms.’’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 1697.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posner, E. (1996b). ‘‘Norms, formalities, and the statute of frauds: A comment.’’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 1971.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. (1994). ‘‘What do judges and justices maximize? (The same thing everybody else does).’’ Supreme Court Economic Review, 3, 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. and Parisi, F. (1998). ‘‘Scuolee Tendenze nella Analisi Economica del diritto.’’ Biblioteca della Liberta, 147, 3-19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G.L (1977). ‘‘The common law process and the selection of efficient rules.’’ Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 65-82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G.L. and Klein, B. (1984). ‘‘The selection of disputes for litigation.’’ Journal of Legal Studies, 13, 1-55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riggs, R.A. (1973). ‘‘Riggs, separation of powers: Congressional riders and the veto power.’’ University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 6, 735, 743-745.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roe, M. (1996). ‘‘Chaos and evolution in law and economics.’’ Harvard Law Review, 109, 641-668.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rogers, D. (1997). ‘‘Clinton warns he’s prepared to veto spending bills if changes aren’t made.’’ Wall Street Journal, October 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin, P.H. (1977). ‘‘Why is the common law efficient?’’ Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 51-63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, A. (1981). Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwartz, Th. (1977). ‘‘Collective choice, separation of issues and vote trading.’’ American Political Science Review, 72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K. (1979). ‘‘Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory,’’ in F. Hahn, and M. Hollis (eds.) Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. (1987). Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions, Fourth Edition. Boston: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stearns, M.L. (1994). ‘‘The misguided renaissance of social choice.’’ Yale Law Journal, 103, 1219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1981). ‘‘Why so much stability.’’ Public Choice, 37(2), 189-202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tunkin, G.I. (1961). ‘‘Remarks on the juridical nature of customary norms in international law.’’ California Law Review, 49, 419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walden, R.M. (1977). ‘‘The subjective element in the formation of customary international law.’’ Israel Law Review, 12, 344.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Francesco Parisi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer Science + Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Parisi, F. (2008). The Perspective of Law. In: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation