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Risk Analysis in Interdependent Infrastructures

  • Yacov Haimes
  • Joost Santos
  • Kenneth Crowther
  • Matthew Henry
  • Chenyang Lian
  • Zhenyu Yan
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 253)

Human activities are defined and influenced by interdependent engineered and socioeconomic systems. In particular, the global economy is increasingly dependent on an interconnected web of infrastructures that permit hitherto unfathomable rates of information exchange, commodity flow and personal mobility. The interconnectedness and interdependencies exhibited by these infrastructures enable them to provide the quality of life to which we have become accustomed and, at the same time, expose seemingly robust and secure systems to risk to which they would otherwise not be subjected. This paper examines several analytical methodologies for risk assessment and management of interdependent macroeconomic and infrastructure systems. They include models for estimating the economic impact of disruptive events, describing complex systems from multiple perspectives, combining sparse data to enhance estimation, and assessing the risk of cyber attack on process control systems.

Keywords: Risk analysis, systems engineering, interdependent systems

Keywords

Critical Infrastructure Process Control System Infrastructure Sector Interdependent System Information Coupling 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yacov Haimes
    • 1
  • Joost Santos
    • 1
  • Kenneth Crowther
    • 1
  • Matthew Henry
    • 2
  • Chenyang Lian
    • 3
  • Zhenyu Yan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Systems and Information EngineeringUniversity of VirginiaCharlottesvilleUSA
  2. 2.Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory in LaurelLaurelUSA
  3. 3.Fair Isaac CorporationSan RafaelUSA

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