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The Role of Hawala Bankers in the Transfer of Proceeds from Organised Crime

  • Henk van de Bunt
Part of the Studies in Organized Crime book series (SOOC, volume 7)

Hawala bankers1 are financial service providers who carry out financial transactions without a license and therefore without government control. They accept cash, cheques or other valuable goods (diamonds, gold) at one location and pay a corresponding sum in cash or other remuneration at another location. This service is comparable with services provided by official banks and by non-banking financial institutions such as Western Union and MoneyGram, yet unlike these companies, hawala bankers disregard the legal obligations concerning the identification of clients, record keeping, and the disclosure of unusual transactions, to which these official financial institutions are subject.

Keywords

International Monetary Fund Money Laundering Financial Transaction Organise Crime Money Transfer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Henk van de Bunt

There are no affiliations available

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