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Criminal Conflicts and Collective Violence: Biker-Related Account Settlements in Quebec, 1994–2001

  • Carlo Morselli
  • Dave Tanguay
  • Anne-Marie Labalette
Part of the Studies in Organized Crime book series (SOOC, volume 7)

In the absence of channels for legitimate contract resolution, violence emerges as an alternative regulatory mechanism between conflicting parties (Black, 1998, 1983). In criminal settings, forms of regulatory violence have been referred to in a number of ways (e.g., contract killings, criminal liquidations, or gangland killings). We use the term “account settlement” to represent lethal or violent conflict resolution methods in criminal settings.1 In this study, we examine fluctuation in an account settlement trend. Our empirical focus is exclusive to the Quebec context, in which account settlements represented approximately 17% of all homicides between 1985 and 1989 (Cusson, Beaulieu, & Cusson, 2003: 300).

Keywords

Organize Crime Public Event Violent Conflict Criminal Enterprise Cumulative Count 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlo Morselli
  • Dave Tanguay
  • Anne-Marie Labalette

There are no affiliations available

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