At the Potter’s Wheel : An Argument for Material Agency

  • Lambros Malafouris


Consider a potter throwing a vessel on the wheel (Fig. 2.1). Think of the complex ways brain, body, wheel and clay relate and interact with one another throughout the different stages of this activity and try to imagine some of the resources (physical, mental or biological) needed for the enaction of this creative process. Focus, for instance, on the first minutes of action when the potter attempts to centre the lump of clay on the wheel. The hands are grasping the clay. The fingers, bent slightly following the surface curvature, sense the clay and exchange vital tactile information necessary for a number of crucial decisions that are about to follow in the next few seconds. What is it that guides the dextrous positioning of the potter’s hands and decides upon the precise amount of forward or downward pressure necessary for centring a lump of clay on the wheel? How do the potter’s fingers come to know the precise force of the appropriate grip? What makes these questions even more...


Agency Problem Intentional State Material Engagement Mental Causation Technical Choice 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McDonald Institute for Archaeological ResearchCambridge UniversityUK

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