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In this and the following chapter we develop methods allowing us to measure the degree to which a state’s administrative apparatus is consistent with collective action, following the theoretical implications laid out in chapter 3. To do this, our comparative coding scheme has two sections, the second of which, presented in the next chapter, is referred to as “Modes of Control of Principals.” By principals we mean rulers, per se, or analogous roles representing the chief executive officers of a state, who hold the ultimate decision-making and policy-making authority. In the present chapter, we develop a method for measuring variability in the non-executive, administrative portion of governments to better understand how the state can recruit, motivate, monitor, and punish its operational staff (“agents”) (Levi 1988: 26, passim), again, in a manner consistent with the requirements of a collective system. More collective polities must be able to provide public goods equitably and monitor and control the behavior of their agents. Solving these collective action problems requires the socio-cultural construction of a suitable institutional and organizational structure, a process we refer to as “bureaucratization.”

Keywords

Collective Action Private Contractor Salaried Official Bureaucratic System Descent Group 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

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