Security Overheads for Signaling in Beyond-3G Networks

  • Dario S. Tonesi
  • Alessandro Tortelli
  • Luca Salgarelli
Conference paper
Part of the Signals and Communication Technology book series (SCT)

The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 6 is an important step towards all-IP, next generation mobile networks. Compared to previous 3GPP networks, Release 6 defines the IP Multimedia Subsystem, a core network architecture completely based on IETF protocols. Among these protocols, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is used for initiating, managing and terminating media sessions. Even though simple and flexible, SIP has not been defined with security in mind. Therefore, 3GPP technical specifications require SIP signaling to be protected by means of IPSec security associations. The use of SIP together with IPSec can result in a significant increase of both the amount of traffic exchanged and the computational load due to signaling inside the core network. This paper analyzes the computational overheads due to security for signaling in 3GPP Release 6 core networks.


Session Initiation Protocol Core Network Advance Encryption Standard User Agent Universal Mobile Telecommunication System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dario S. Tonesi
    • 1
  • Alessandro Tortelli
    • 1
  • Luca Salgarelli
    • 1
  1. 1.Università degli Studi di BresciaItaly

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