Conventional Cryptographic Primitives



Modern network security systems contain cryptographic primitives as an essential building block. In this chapter, we discuss conventional cryptographic primitives, which are also known as symmetric primitives. The term “symmetric” stems from the fact that in order to use conventional primitives, all parties need to share the same set of secret keys. Hence, all parties have the same capabilities. This is not the case with asymmetric primitives, where some keys are known to one party only.


Hash Function Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Stream Cipher Message Authentication Code 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical Engineering/ESATKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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