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Current Mask Generation: an Analog Circuit to Thwart DPA Attacks

  • Daniel Mesquita
  • Jean-Denis Techer
  • Lionel Torres
  • Michel Robert
  • Guy Cathebras
  • Gilles Sassatelli
  • Fernando G. Moraes
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Proc book series (IFIPAICT, volume 240)

This work addresses the leakage information problem concerning cryptographic circuits. Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms may let escape some side channel information, like electromagnetic emanations, temperature, computing time, and power consumption. With this information, an attacker can retrieve the data that is being computed, like cryptographic keys. This paper proposes a novel method to thwart DPA attacks, based on power consumption control. As main contribution, this approach not requires any modification on the cryptographic algorithm, the messages or keys.

Keywords

Power Consumption Current Consumption Analog Circuit Cryptographic Algorithm Side Channel Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Mesquita
    • 1
  • Jean-Denis Techer
    • 1
  • Lionel Torres
    • 1
  • Michel Robert
    • 1
  • Guy Cathebras
    • 1
  • Gilles Sassatelli
    • 1
  • Fernando G. Moraes
    • 2
  1. 1.LIRMM – Université Montpellier IIFrance
  2. 2.PPGCC/FACIN/PUCRSAgronomiaBrazil

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