Lessons Learned from Mexico’s Payment for Environmental Services Program

  • Jennifer Alix-Garcia
  • Alain de Janvry
  • Elisabeth Sadoulet
  • Juan Manuel
Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 31)


This chapter outlines the evolution of Mexico’s payments for hydrological services program from its inception through the first 2 years of the program’s implementation. Background information on forests, deforestation, and potential environmental services provide context for a political economy analysis of the path the program traveled through Mexico’s legislative and administrative structures. We also analyze the characteristics of the recipients during the first 2 years, including results from a survey of participants and community case studies. A final section extracts lessons from the Mexican experience, including possible alternative program designs to address some of the problems encountered in its implementation.


Environmental Service Cloud Forest North American Free Trade Agreement Forest Loss Conditional Cash Transfer 
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This document is based upon a report prepared for Randy Stringer formerly at the Comparative Studies Service Agricultural and Development Economics Division, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The work was coordinated by Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, professors at the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California at Berkeley. The Political Economy section is largely based on the contribution by Josefina Braña Varela and Maria Zorilla Ramos. Fieldwork for the study cases was coordinated by Jaime Sainz, Adán Martínez, and Josefina Braña.


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Copyright information

© FAO 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jennifer Alix-Garcia
    • 1
  • Alain de Janvry
    • Elisabeth Sadoulet
      • Juan Manuel
      1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of San FranciscoSan FranciscoUSA

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