Dynamic Pricing and Revenue Management
An active and rapidly growing applied operations research discipline is the field known as revenue management (RM). The principal intent of revenue management is to extract all unused willingness to pay from consumers of differentiated services and products. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) provide a comprehensive introduction to most aspects of the theory and practice of revenue management. For this chapter, our goal is to illustrate and solve some differentialNash games that occur in network revenue management and that provide critical information about pricing, resource allocation, and demand management to retailers and service providers.
KeywordsService Provider Variational Inequality Optimal Control Problem Dynamic Price Evolutionary Game
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List of References Cited and Additional Reading
- Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine (1999). The Theory of Learning in Games (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
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- Kachani, S., G. Perakis, and C. Simon (2004). A transient model for joint pricing and demand learning under competition. Presented in the 4th Annual INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section Conference, MIT, Cambridge.Google Scholar
- Mookherjee, R. and T. Friesz (2008). Pricing, allocation, and overbooking in dynamic service network competition when demand is uncertain. Production and Operations Management 14(4), 1–20.Google Scholar
- Talluri, K. T. and G. J. van Ryzin (2004). The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management. New York: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar