Advertisement

Quality and supply chain management

Part of the International Series In Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 113)

Managing (non) quality and the risk consequences have generally assumed that the underlying uncertainty faced by firms, individually and collectively, is neutral! In other words, uncertainty and risk are not motivated while issues relating to information, information and power and parties’ intentionalities are mostly neglected. Supply chains however are beset by multiple parties interacting with broadly varying motivations, information and power asymmetries. In addition, there may be conflicting and competitive objectives as well as environments (in the form of governments, other supply chains and interest groups) that render the management of quality in supply chains far more strategic. This raises many problems that are specific to supply chains and require particular attention.

Keywords

Supply Chain Information Asymmetry Supply Chain Management Versus Versus Versus Versus Versus Acceptance Sampling 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Burke R, Davis DR, F.C. Kaminsky (1993) The (k1,k2) game. Quality Progress 26: 49-53.Google Scholar
  2. Corbett C, Tang C (1999) Designing supply contracts: contract type and information asymmetry in Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management. Tayur S, Ganeshan R, Magazine M, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA.Google Scholar
  3. Eppen GD, Hurst EG Jr. (1974) Optimal location of inspection stations in a multistage production process. Management Science 20: 1194-2000.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Hurst EG Jr. (1974) Imperfect inspection in a multistage production process. Management Science 20: 378-384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Lee HL, Tagaras G (1992) Economic acceptance sampling plans in complex multi-stage production systems. International Journal of Production Research 30: 2615-2632.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Lim W (2001) Producer-supplier contracts with incomplete information. Management Science 47(5): 709-715.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Moulin H (1995) Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Intro-duction. Princeton University Press. Priceton, New Jersey.Google Scholar
  8. Mukhopadhyay SK, Kouvelis P (1997) A differential game theoretic model for duopolistic competition on design quality. Operations Research 45: 886-893.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Nash F (1950) Equilibrium points in N-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36:48-9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Raz T (1986) A survey of models for allocating inspection effort in multistage production systems. Journal of Quality Technology 18(4): 239-247.Google Scholar
  11. Reyniers DJ (1992) Supplier-Customer interaction in Quality Control. Annals of Operations Research 34: 307-330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Reyniers DJ, Tapiero CS (1995a) The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer contracts. Management Science 41: 1581-1589.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Reyniers DJ, Tapiero CS (1995b) Contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment. Euro J. of Operational Research 82: 373-382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Shubik M (2002) Game theory and operations research: some musings 50 years later. Operations Research 50: 192-196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Stackleberg von HV (1934) Marktform and Gleichgweicht, Vienna, Springer Verlag.Google Scholar
  16. Stackleberg HV (1952) The Theory of the Market Economy, Translated by Peacock AT, London, William Hodge and Co.Google Scholar
  17. Starbird SA (1994) The effect of acceptance sampling and risk aversion on the quality delivered by suppliers. Journal of the Operational Research Society 45: 309-320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Stuart HW Jr. (2001) Cooperative games and business strategy. In Game Theory and Business Applications, Chatterjee K, Samuelson WF, editors. Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  19. Tagaras G, Lee HL (1996) Economic models for vendor evaluation with quality cost analysis. Management Science 42: 1531-1543.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Tapiero CS (1995) Acceptance sampling in a producer-supplier conflicting environment: Risk neutral case. Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis 11: 3-12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Tapiero CS (1996) The Management of Quality and Its Control, Chapman and Hall, London.Google Scholar
  22. Tapiero CS (2001) Yield and and Control in a Supplier-Customer Relationship. International Journal of Production Research 39: 1505-1515.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Tapiero CS (2004) Risk and Financial Management: Mathematical and Computational Concepts, Wiley, London.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Tapiero CS (2005a) Environmental Quality Control and Environmental Games, working paper.Google Scholar
  25. Tapiero CS (2005b) Modeling Environmental Queue Control: A Game Model, Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment.Google Scholar
  26. Tsay A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N (1998) Modeling supply chain contracts: A review, in Tayur S, Magazine M, Ganeshan R. (eds) Quantitative Models of Supply Chain Management, Kluwer International Series.Google Scholar
  27. Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Wetherhill GB (1977) Sampling Inspection and Quality Control, Chapman and Hall, New York.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Personalised recommendations