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Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas

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Book cover New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas

More than three and a half centuries ago, the great ancestor of the contemporary social dilemma researchers, Thomas Hobbes, published the most influential book on social dilemmas ever (Hobbes, 1651) and argued that social order cannot be maintained without authority that controls individuals’ unrestricted pursuit of selfinterest. According to Hobbes, people who prefer peace (mutual cooperation) to a war of all against all (mutual defection) should agree to give birth to Leviathan, or a government or authority that enforces social order.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan

    Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi

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  1. Mizuho Shinada
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  2. Toshio Yamagishi
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  1. Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden

    Anders Biel , Daniel Eek , Tommy Gärling  & Mathias Gustafsson , ,  & 

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Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T. (2008). Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas. In: Biel, A., Eek, D., Gärling, T., Gustafsson, M. (eds) New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_7

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