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Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas

  • Mizuho Shinada
  • Toshio Yamagishi

More than three and a half centuries ago, the great ancestor of the contemporary social dilemma researchers, Thomas Hobbes, published the most influential book on social dilemmas ever (Hobbes, 1651) and argued that social order cannot be maintained without authority that controls individuals’ unrestricted pursuit of selfinterest. According to Hobbes, people who prefer peace (mutual cooperation) to a war of all against all (mutual defection) should agree to give birth to Leviathan, or a government or authority that enforces social order.

Keywords

Public Good Social Preference Free Rider Social Dilemma Social Value Orientation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mizuho Shinada
    • 1
  • Toshio Yamagishi
    • 1
  1. 1.Hokkaido UniversityJapan

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