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Ostmann, A., Meinhardt, H. (2008). Toward an Analysis of Cooperation and Fairness That Includes Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory. In: Biel, A., Eek, D., Gärling, T., Gustafsson, M. (eds) New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_14
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