Toward an Analysis of Cooperation and Fairness That Includes Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory

  • Axel Ostmann
  • Holger Meinhardt


Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Grand Coalition Social Dilemma Payoff Vector 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Axel Ostmann
    • 1
  • Holger Meinhardt
    • 2
  1. 1.University of SaarlandGermany
  2. 2.University of KarlsruheGermany

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