Advertisement

Will Lessons from Small-Scale Social Dilemmas Scale Up?

  • Michael McGinnis
  • Elinor Ostrom

In this chapter, we ask whether the design principles that have been proposed as ways of solving small- and medium-sized dilemmas related to use of resources are applicable at a larger scale. Obviously, these principles do not scale up automatically. On the other hand, more hope exists regarding the feasibility of scaling up than is sometimes expressed in the literature (Ostrom et al., 1999).1 We analyze the problem of scaling up solutions to social dilemma problems. We focus primarily on common pool resources where everyone’s use potentially subtracts from the benefits available to others. Without some regularized boundary rules and use rules, as well as means of monitoring, sanctioning, and resolving disputes, there are major challenges in keeping individuals from adversely affecting these resources. Before addressing the design principles, let us first address the problem of matching institutions to the type of goods involved.

Keywords

Social Capital Design Principle Institutional Arrangement Private Good Dispute Settlement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Acheson, J. (2003). Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.Google Scholar
  2. Anderies, J. M., Janssen, M., Ostrom, E. (2004). A framework to analyze the robustness of social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecology and Society, 9(1), 18.Google Scholar
  3. Andresen, S. (2002). The International Whaling Commission (IWC): More failure than success? In: E. L. Miles, A. Underhal, S. Andresen, J. Wettestad, J. Birger Skjær Seth & E. M. Carlin (eds.), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (pp. 379–403). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  4. Aristotle (1942). Politics. Trans. B. Jowett. New York: Modern Library.Google Scholar
  5. Ashby, W. R. (1960). Design for a Brain: The Origin of Adaptive Behavior (2nd ed.). New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
  6. Bickers, K., Williams, J. T. (2001). Public Policy Analysis: A Political Economy Approach. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
  7. Blomquist, W. (1992). Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California. San Francisco: ICS Press.Google Scholar
  8. Buck, S. J. (1998). The Global Commons: An Introduction. Washington, DC: Island Press.Google Scholar
  9. Burns, W. C. B., Gillespie, A. (eds.) (2003). The Future of Cetaceans in a Changing World. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.Google Scholar
  10. Chayes, A., Chayes, A. H. (1995). The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Chopra, S. K., D’Amato, A. (1991). Whales: Their emerging right to life. American Journal of International Law, 85(1), 21–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Clark, C. W. (1980). Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: A game-theoretic analysis. In P.-T. Liu (ed.), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics (pp. 117–132). New York: Plenum Press.Google Scholar
  13. Collier, J. G., Lowe, V. (1999). The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Copes, P. (1986). A critical review of the individual quota as a device in fisheries management. Land Economics, 62(3), 278–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A. (eds.) (2002). Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  16. Cruz, M. C. (1991). Population pressure, deforestation, and common property institutions: An overview. Paper presented at the Second Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), Winnipeg, September 26–29.Google Scholar
  17. Dahlman, C. J. (1980). The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  18. De Alessi, L. (1993). How markets alleviate scarcity. In V. Ostrom, D. Feeny & H. Picht (eds.), Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices (pp. 339–376). San Francisco: ICS Press.Google Scholar
  19. Ebbin, S. A. (2002). Enhanced fit through institutional interplay in the Pacific Northwest salmon co-management regime. Marine Policy, 26, 253–259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B. J., Acheson, J. M. (1990). The tragedy of the commons: Twenty-two years later. Human Ecology, 18(1), 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Franzen, A. (1994). Group size effects in social dilemmas: A review of the experimental literature and some new results for one-shot N-PD games. In U. Schulz, W. Albers & U. Mueller (eds.), Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (pp. 117–145). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  22. Friedheim, R. (ed.) (2001). Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute Press.Google Scholar
  23. Gibson, C., Williams, J., Ostrom, E. (2005). Local enforcement and better forests. World Development, 33(2), 273–284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Gillespie, A. (2002). Forum shopping in international environmental law: The IWC, CITES, and the management of Cetaceans. Ocean Development & International Law, 33(1), 17–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Goodwin, M. (1994). Nine principles for making virtual communities work. Wired, 2(6) (June), 72–73.Google Scholar
  26. Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common property resource: The fishery. Journal of Political Economy, 62 (April), 124–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Haas, P. M. (1989). Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control. International Organization, 43, 378–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Hanisch, M., McGinnis, M. (2005). Analyzing problems of polycentric governance in the growing EU. Paper presented at Workshop on Analyzing Problems of Polycentric Governance in the Growing EU, Humboldt University, Berlin, June 16–17, 2005. http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/intro_berlin.pdf.Google Scholar
  29. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Hardin, G. (1978). Political requirements for preserving our common heritage. In H. P. Bokaw (ed.), Wildlife and America (pp. 310–317). Washington, DC: Council on Environmental Quality.Google Scholar
  31. Hayes, T., Ostrom, E. (2005). Conserving the world’s forests: Are protected areas the only way? Indiana Law Review, 38(3), 595–619.Google Scholar
  32. Heikkila, T., Gerlak, A. K. (2005). The formation of large-scale collaborative resource management institutions: Clarifying the roles of stakeholders, science, and institutions. Policy Studies Journal, 33(4), 583–612.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Hurwicz, L. (1973). The design of mechanisms for resource allocation. American Economic Review, 63(2), 1–30.Google Scholar
  34. Jones, E. C. (2003). Building on Ostrom’s “the rudiments of a theory of the origins, survival, and performance of common-property institutions”. Journal of Ecological Anthropology, 7, 65–72.Google Scholar
  35. Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Keohane, R. O. (2001). Governance in a partially globalized world. American Political Science Review, 95(1), 1–13.Google Scholar
  37. Kirch, P. V. (1997). Microcosmic histories: Island perspectives on “global” change. American Anthropologist, 99(1), 30–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Kollock, P. (1997). Design principles for online communities. In The Internet and Society: Harvard Conference Proceedings. Cambridge, MA: O’Reilly & Associates.Google Scholar
  39. Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D. (eds.) (2004). The Rational Design of International Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  40. Lam, W. F. (1998). Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action. Oakland, CA: ICS Press.Google Scholar
  41. Lambin, E. F., et al. (2001). The causes of land-use and land-cover change: Moving beyond the myths. Global Environmental Change, 11, 261–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Lele, U. (ed.) (2002). Managing a Global Resource: Challenges of Forest Conservation and Development. World Bank Series on Evaluation and Development, vol. 5. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
  43. Lichbach, M. I. (1996). The Cooperator’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  44. Mattli, W. (2001). Private litigation in a global economy: From litigation to arbitration. International Organization, 55(4) (October), 919–947.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. McGinnis, M. (ed.) (2000). Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  46. McGinnis, M., Ostrom, E. (1992). Institutional analysis and global climate change: Design principles for robust international regimes. In M. Rice, J. Snow & H. Jacobson (eds.), Global Climate Change: Social and Economic Research Issues. Proceedings of a conference held at Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, IL, pp. 45–85.Google Scholar
  47. Miller, G. J. (1992). Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  48. Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 739–777.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. International Organization, 44, 479–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Orrego Vicuña, F. (2004). International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global Society: Constitutionalization, Accessibility, Privatization. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  51. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  52. Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  53. Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C., Norgaard, R., Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the commons: Local lessons, global challenges. Science, 283, 278–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., Walker, J. M. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  55. Ostrom, E., Ostrom, V. (1977). Public goods and public choices. In E. S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance (pp. 7–49). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  56. Ostrom, V. (2007). The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment (3rd ed.). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  57. Petersmann, E.-U. (1997). The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement. London and Boston: Kluwer Law International.Google Scholar
  58. Polanyi, M. (1951). The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  59. Reinicke, W. H. (1998). Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
  60. Rudolph, C. (2001). Constructing an atrocities regime: The politics of war crimes tribunals. International Organization, 55(3) (September), 655–691.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Samuelson, P. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36, 387–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  62. Sandell, R., Stern, C. (1998). Group size and the logic of collective action: A network analysis of a Swedish temperance movement 1896–1937. Rationality and Society, 10(3), 327–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Schaefer, M. (1957). Some considerations of population dynamics and economics in relation to the management of the commercial marine fisheries. Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 14, 669–681.Google Scholar
  64. Scott, A. (1979). Development of economic theory of fisheries regulation. Journal of the Fisheries Board of Canada, 36, 725–740.Google Scholar
  65. Scott, A. (1982). Regulation and the location of jurisdictional powers: The fishery. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 20, 780–805.Google Scholar
  66. Shepsle, K. A. (1989). Studying institutions: Some lessons from the rational choice approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 131–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Simon, H. A. (1981). The Sciences of the Artificial (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  68. Stoett, P. J. (1997). The International Politics of Whaling. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.Google Scholar
  69. Tang, S. Y. (1992). Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation. San Francisco: ICS Press.Google Scholar
  70. Tostensen, A., Bull, B. (2002). Are smart sanctions feasible? World Politics, 54(3) (April), 373–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  71. Townsend, R. E. (1986). A critique of models of the American lobster fishery. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 13, 277–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  72. Townsend, R. E., Wilson, J. (1987). An economic view of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. In B. J. McCay & J. M. Acheson (eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (pp. 311–326). Tucson: University of Arizona Press.Google Scholar
  73. Uzawa, H. (2005). Economic Analysis of Social Common Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  74. Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Ostrom, E. (1991). Rent dissipation and balanced deviation disequilibrium in common-pool resources: Experimental evidence. In R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets (pp. 337–367). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  75. Weimer, D. L., Vining, A. R. (1989). Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  76. Weinstein, M. S. (2000). Pieces of the puzzle: Solutions for community-based fisheries management from native Canadians, Japanese cooperatives, and common property researchers. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 12(2), 375–412.Google Scholar
  77. Wilson, J. A. (2002). Scientific uncertainty, complex systems, and the design of common-pool institutions. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (eds.), The Drama of the Commons (pp. 327–329). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Google Scholar
  78. Young, O. R. (1989). The politics of international regime formation: Managing natural resources and the environment. International Organization, 43, 349–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  79. Young, O. R. (1994). International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  80. Young, O. R. (ed.) (1999). The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  81. Young, O. R. (2002). Institutional interplay: The environmental consequences of cross-scale interactions. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (eds.), The Drama of the Commons (pp. 263–292). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Google Scholar
  82. Zacher, M. W., with Sutton, B. A. (1996). Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and Communications. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael McGinnis
    • 1
  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 1
  1. 1.Indiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

Personalised recommendations