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Reciprocity, Proximity and Performance of Research Consortia

  • Neslihan Aydogan
  • Thomas P Lyon
Chapter
Part of the International Studies in Entrepreneurship book series (ISEN, volume 18)

Introduction

The Japanese model of publicly funded consortia was adopted in the United States beginning in the 1980s following the relaxation of antitrust restrictions on joint research and development (R&D). A great example of such an effort is Sematech (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology), a publicly subsidized consortium of 14 semiconductor firms. As we will explain, the economics of consortia has been tackled from several angles including knowledge transfer between the consortium and its members (e.g., see Sakakibara 1997; Link et al. 1996; Irwin and Klenow 1996). However, there is no theoretical work that models the transfer of tacit, that is, difficult to codify, knowledge between the member firms and the consortium within a geographical context. This is what we add to the consortium literature in this study. The relatively simple mathematical setup provides us with intuition to understand the mechanics behind knowledge transfer among the...

Keywords

Knowledge Transfer Tacit Knowledge Geographical Proximity Knowledge Exchange Repeated Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Neslihan Aydogan
    • 1
  • Thomas P Lyon
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsÇankaya UniversityUSA

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