Side-Channel Resistant Circuit Styles and Associated IC Design Flow

  • Kris Tiri
Part of the Integrated Circuits and Systems book series (ICIR)


The supply current variations, which are being analyzed to find the secret information, are the aggregated effect of the supply current variations of the individual switching logic gates that make up the microcontroller- or ASIC-based encryption system under attack. The fundamental reason that the information is leaked through the power supply is that the logic gates have an asymmetric power consumption. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.1, only when the output of the logic gate makes a 0–1 transition, a current comes from the power supply and charges the output capacitance. In all other cases, no or only a limited amount of energy (due to short circuit or leakage) is consumed from the power supply. Hence by observing the supply current, one has information on the switching event and the state of the logic gate.


Logic Gate Switching Event Current Mode Logic Logic Style Signal Arrival Time 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Work done while at University of CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

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