Abstract
The supply current variations, which are being analyzed to find the secret information, are the aggregated effect of the supply current variations of the individual switching logic gates that make up the microcontroller- or ASIC-based encryption system under attack. The fundamental reason that the information is leaked through the power supply is that the logic gates have an asymmetric power consumption. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.1, only when the output of the logic gate makes a 0–1 transition, a current comes from the power supply and charges the output capacitance. In all other cases, no or only a limited amount of energy (due to short circuit or leakage) is consumed from the power supply. Hence by observing the supply current, one has information on the switching event and the state of the logic gate.
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Tiri, K. (2010). Side-Channel Resistant Circuit Styles and Associated IC Design Flow. In: Verbauwhede, I. (eds) Secure Integrated Circuits and Systems. Integrated Circuits and Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71829-3_8
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